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ABSTRACT
Essay 1: Zero as a Special Price: the True Value of Free Products
When faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products (or possibly
buying nothing), according to standard theoretical perspectives, people will choose the
option with the highest cost-benefit difference. However, we propose that decisions
about free (zero price) products differ, in that people do not simply subtract costs from
benefits and perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher.
We test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that
maintain the price difference between the goods, but vary the prices such that the cheaper
good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price. In contrast with a standard
cost-benefit perspective, in the zero price condition, dramatically more participants
choose the cheaper option, whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more
expensive option. Thus, people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only
decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits. After documenting this basic effect, we
propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect, including social norms,
mapping difficulty, and affect. Affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect.
Essay 2: Movies as a Mood Regulation Tool: Movie Watching Patterns Right After
September 11.
Is a sad person more, less or equally likely than a happy person to pursue a "happy"
activity rather than an "unhappy" one (e.g. prefer a comedy to a drama)? Surprisingly, the
literature offers theories and laboratory evidence in favor of all three possibilities. In this
paper I attempt to resolve the puzzle by moving out of the lab and analyzing the changes
in movie watching patterns following the tragic events of Sep 11, 2001. Two data sets
from the 7 weeks surrounding 9/11 are analyzed. One consists of US box office
collections of top ten movies during the period. The other contains data on movie rentals
in a rental store chain in Cambridge MA. The analysis suggests that the more private the
mood-regulating decision is (rental vs. movie going), the more likely is the person to use
the movie as a mood repair tool. When the decision is more public (movie going), the
appropriateness issues induce more mood congruent behavior.
Essay 3: Measuring Liking and Wanting
Recently neuroscientists have gathered a vast body of evidence that wanting (motivated
preferences) and liking (non-motivated prferences) are not one and the same. We explore
the possibility of measuring the two types of preferences uintrusiveley, in a behavioral
lab. In particular we find that wanting and liking for viewing pictures of attractive people
are not perfectly aligned and expessially for men.
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Essay 1
Zero as a special price: The true value of free products
Abstract
When faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products (or possibly
buying nothing), according to standard theoretical perspectives, people will choose the
option with the highest cost-benefit difference. However, we propose that decisions
about free (zero price) products differ, in that people do not simply subtract costs from
benefits and perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher.
We test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that
maintain the price difference between the goods, but vary the prices such that the cheaper
good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price. In contrast with a standard
cost-benefit perspective, in the zero price condition, dramatically more participants
choose the cheaper option, whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more
expensive option. Thus, people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only
decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits. After documenting this basic effect, we
propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect, including social norms,
mapping difficulty, and affect. Affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect.
Zero as a special price: The true value of free products
1. Introduction
"The point about zero is that we do not need to use it in the operations of daily life. No
one goes out to buy zero fish. It is in a way the most civilized of all the cardinals, and its
use is only forced on us by the needs of cultivated modes of thought."
-Alfred North Whitehead
Initially invented by Babylonians not as a number but as a placeholder, the
concept of zero and void was feared and denied by Pythagoras, Aristotle, and their
followers for centuries. The most central objection of the early Greeks to zero was based
on religious beliefs; they argued that god was infinite and therefore void (zero) was not
possible. In addition to religious arguments, the early Greeks did not recognize their need
for zero, because their mathematics were based on geometry, which made zero and
negative numbers unnecessary. This failure to adopt the concept of zero likely impeded
their discovery of calculus and slowed the development of mathematics for centuries.
The concept of zero as a number was brought to India by Alexander the Great,
where it was first accepted. In India, unlike Greece, algebra was separate from geometry,
infinity and void appeared within the same system of beliefs (i.e., destruction, purity, and
new beginnings), and the concept of zero flourished. The notion of zero later found its
way into Arabia and later immigrated to Europe. Because Aristotle had not accepted zero
and because Christianity was partially based on Aristotelian philosophy and his "proof of
God," zero was not widely embraced by the Christian world until the sixteenth century.1
1 For a good source describing the history of zero, see Seife (2000).
In more recent history, the concept of zero enters into the understanding of
multiple aspects of human psychology. In various domains, zero is used in a qualitatively
different manner from other numbers; and the transition from small positive numbers to
zero often is discontinuous.
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) shows that getting a
zero reward can increase liking for the task compared with receiving a small positive
reward. Subsequent work reveals that changing a reward from something to nothing can
influence motivation (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) and switch it from intrinsic to
extrinsic (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973), alter self-perception (Bem 1965), and affect
feelings of competence and control (Deci and Ryan 1985). For example, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a) demonstrate that introducing a penalty for parents who are late
picking up their children from kindergarten can actually increase tardiness. Similarly,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) find that though performance in tasks such as IQ tests or
collecting money for charity increases, as expected, with the size of a positive piece-wise
reward, the zero reward represents an exception in which performance is greater when no
reward is mentioned relative to when a small reward exists.
Related to these findings on motivation and incomplete contracts, it has also been
shown that when prices are mentioned, people apply market norms, but when prices are
not mentioned (i.e., the price effectively is zero), they apply social norms to determine
their choices and effort (Heyman and Ariely 2004). As an illustration, Ariely, Gneezy,
and Haruvy (2006) show that when offered a piece of Starburst candy at a cost of 1 per
piece, students take approximately four pieces; when the price is zero, more students take
the candy, but almost no one takes more than one piece (i.e., decreased demand when
prices are reduced).
Finally, in a different domain and in the most influential research on the
psychology of zero, Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) work on probabilities indicates that
when it comes to gambles, people perceive zero probability (and certainty) substantially
differently than they do small positive probabilities. That is, whereas the values of the
latter are perceived as higher than they actually are, perceptions of zero probability are
accurate.
In this work, we extend research on the psychology of zero to pricing and
examine the psychology of "free." Intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest that in some
sense, people value free things too much. When Ben and Jerry's offer free ice-cream
cones, or Starbucks offers free coffee, many people spend hours in line waiting to get the
free item, which they could buy on a different day for two to three dollars. At first glance,
it might not be surprising that the demand for a good is very high when the price is very
low (zero), but the extent of the effect is intuitively too large to be explained by this
simple economic argument. The goal of this paper is to examine the validity of this
intuition, and to establish the causes of the phenomenon.
In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that when people are faced with a
choice between two products, one of which is free, they overreact to the free product as if
zero price meant not only a low cost of buying the product but also its increased
valuation. In the next section, we describe a method to examine reaction and overreaction
to free products. In Section 3, we detail two formal models: one that treats the price of
zero as any other price, and one that includes a unique role for zero. The contrasts
between these two models provide some predictions for the effects of price reductions on
demand. Then, in Section 4, we report experimental evidence in support of the zero-price
model. We take a first step in finding the psychological causes that bring about the effect
of zero price and test them in Section 5, then end with general conclusions and some
questions for further research.
2. Measuring Reaction/Overreaction to Zero Price
To determine if people overreact to free products, we might simply test whether
consumers take much more of a product when it is free than they buy of the product when
it has a very low price (e.g., 10 ). However, though such behavior would be consistent
with an overreaction to free, it also could simply reflect an increase in demand when
price decreases. Similarly, it is not sufficient to show that the increase in demand when
price falls from 1 to zero is greater than the increase in demand when the price drops
from 20 to 1 0 because such a pattern of behavior could reflect a demand structure that is
nonlinear in price (e.g., created by a valuation distribution in which more people value
the product between 00 and 1 than between 1 and 20).
To measure reaction to zero and overcome these possible alternative
interpretations, we examine whether people select a free product even when they must
forgo an option that they "should" find preferable. We employ a method that contrasts
two choice situations that involve a constant difference between two products' net
benefits and use aggregate preference inconsistency as a measure of overreaction to the
free product. The basic structure of this approach (and our experiments) is as follows: All
subjects may choose among three options: buy a low-value product (e.g., one Hershey's
Kiss; hereafter "Hershey's"), buy a higher-value product (e.g., one Lindt truffle), or buy
nothing. The variation across conditions that enables us to measure their reaction to the
price of zero relies on two basic conditions: "cost" and "free." In the cost condition, the
prices of both products are positive (e.g., Hershey's costs 1 and the Lindt truffle 14¢). In
the free condition, both prices are reduced by the same amount, so that the cheaper good
becomes free (e.g., Hershey's is free, and the Lindt truffle is 130).
We also consider how such constant price reductions might influence demand for
these two products in a model in which zero is particularly attractive and a one in which
zero is just another price so that we may better understand how this scenario might test
whether the price of zero has some added attraction. According to a model in which the
price of zero is particularly attractive, a price reduction from the cost condition to the free
condition should create a boost in the attractiveness of the product that has become free
and hence increase its relative demand. However, from the perspective of a model in
which zero is just another price, because all changes in prices are the same, reducing one
of the prices to zero should not create any unique advantage. In the next section, we
examine these two models more formally and provide some testable predictions for
distinguishing between them.
3. Formal Account of Standard Economic and Zero Price Models
We describe a "standard" model of how consumers behave in a situation in which
they must choose between two products at certain prices (or buy nothing), as well as how
their choices might change if both prices are reduced by the same amount. We then
consider a special case of this situation in which the price decrease is equal to the original
smaller price; that is, the new smaller price is zero. Furthermore, we contrast this
standard model with the zero price model, which is identical in all respects except that it
assumes that when a product becomes free, its intrinsic value for consumers (or "benefit,"
in cost-benefit terminology) increases. After clarifying the different predictions of the
two models regarding the observable behavior of consumers, we empirically test them in
Section 4.
Consider a model with linear utilities in which a consumer must choose among
three options X, Y, and N (we discuss the linearity assumption in detail subsequently).
Option X refers to buying one unit of product X priced at Px; option Y means buying one
unit of product Y priced at Py; and option N means the consumer buys nothing. Suppose
that the consumer values the first product at Vx and the second product at Vy; he or she
then will choose X if and only if
Vx > Px and Vx - Px > Vy - Py. (1) 2
The consumer will choose Y if and only if
Vy > Py and Vy - Py > Vx - Px. (2)
Finally the consumer will buy nothing (choose N) if and only if
Vx < Px and Vy < Py. (3)
2 Without loss of generality, we may assume that the probability that any of these or subsequent inequalities
turns into an equality is zero.
Assume there are multiple consumers with [Vx, Vy] distributed over R2 ; the three
sets of inequalities determine three groups of consumers who choose each of the three
options (see Figure 1 a).
Now consider a situation in which both prices are reduced by the same amount e.
The new prices thus are equal to [Px - e, Py - E]. How do the demand segments change?
With the new prices, consumers who choose X are those with
Vx > Px - E and Vx - Px > Vy - Py. (la)
Consumers choosing Y are those with
Vy > Py - s and Vy - Py > Vx - Px. (2a)
Finally, consumers choosing N are those with
Vx < Px -, and Vy < Py- E. (3a)
Comparing the two sets of formulas (or inspecting Figure lb), we note that
consumers who originally choose X keep choosing X, and consumers who originally
choose Y keep choosing Y. Thus, according to this model, there should be no switching
from one product to another. The only two possible changes in demand are that some
consumers who originally buy nothing switch to either X (those with Vx - Px > Vy - Py
and Px - s < Vx < Px) or Y (those with Vy - Py > Vx - Px and Py - < Vy < Py).
In short, according to this simple cost-benefit model, when prices decrease by the
same amount, the costs decrease by the same magnitude for both products, whereas their
benefits remain the same, and hence, the net benefits increase by the same amount. In
turn, this model predicts that when the prices of both products drop by the same amount,
both demands increase weakly (see Table 1).
Now consider a special case in which the price reduction, E, equals the original
smaller price, say Px, so that the prices drop from [Px, Py] to [0, Py - Px]. If zero is just
another price, the preceding predictions remain valid. In our study setting, when prices
decrease from the cost condition to the free condition, the proportion of consumers
choosing each of the two products should increase weakly (see Figure Ic).
Next, consider the zero price model, which assumes that when a product becomes
free, consumers attach a special value to it, that is, their intrinsic valuation of the good
increases by, say, a. Note, the decision to add a to the benefit (intrinsic valuation) of the
free good is rather arbitrary. All the predictions would go through just the same, if we
assume that a is added directly to the net benefit of the free good or subtracted from its
cost, or even added to the costs of all non-free goods (extra pain of paying). We will
discuss he nature of a in more detail after the initial empirical findings are presented.
In this model, and in contrast with the standard model, some consumers switch
from the more expensive good to the cheaper good if their valuations of the products
satisfy the following set of inequalities. The first two inequalities imply the original
choice of Y, and the second two inequalities lead to switching to X when its price is
reduced to zero:
Vy > Py,
Vy - Py > Vx - Px,
Vx + a > 0, and
Vx + a - Px > Vy - Py. (4)
That is, as the prices fall from the cost condition to the free condition, the costs
decrease by the same magnitude for both products, the benefit for the now free product
increases more than that for the more expensive product, and the net benefit of the
cheaper product becomes higher. In terms of demand, the zero price model predicts that
as prices are reduced from the cost condition to the free condition, the demand for the
cheaper good increases, and more importantly, the demand for the more expensive good
may decrease as consumers switch from the more expensive product to the cheaper one
(see Table 1, Figure 1 d). We refer to the combination of the increase in the proportion of
consumers choosing X and the decrease of those choosing Y when prices fall from [Px,
Py] to [0, Py - Px] as the zero price effect. The prediction regarding the decrease in
demand for the more expensive good represents the one observable difference between
the two models, and thus, in our empirical section, we focus on it.
*** Figure 1 & Table 1...
4. Testing the Phenomenon
In this section, we describe a series of experiments designed to test the validity of
the zero price model and rule out some trivial economic explanations for the changes in
demand that take place as the price of the cheaper good decreases to zero (i.e., from the
cost condition to the free condition).
4.1. Experiment 1: Survey
Method. We asked 60 participants to make a hypothetical choice among a
Hershey's, a Ferrero Rocher chocolate, and buying nothing (we provided pictures of both
chocolates). Across the three conditions, the prices of the two chocolates decreased by a
constant amount (for a description of all conditions across all the experiments, see the
Appendix). In the cost condition, the prices of Hershey's and Ferrero were 1¢ and 26¢,
respectively (1 &26 condition). In the free condition, both prices were reduced by 10 and
therefore were 0O and 250, respectively (0&25 condition). The third condition (2&27
condition) represents an additional cost condition in which the prices of goods increased
by 10 above their prices in the first cost condition. The purpose of the 2&27 condition is
to contrast the effect of a 1 ¢ price reduction that does not include a reduction to 0
(reduction from 2&27 to 1&26) with a 10 price reduction that does (reduction from 1&26
to 0&25).
Results and Discussion. We provide the results in Figure 2. As the prices
decrease from the 1&26 condition to the 0&25 condition, the demand for Hershey's
increases substantially (t(31) = 3.8, p < 0.001) while, more importantly, the demand for
Ferrero decreases substantially (t(31) = -2.3, p = 0.03), in support of the zero price effect.
The difference in demand between the 1&26 and 2&27 conditions is imperceptible
(Hershey's t(38) = -0.3, p = 0.76; Ferrero t(38) = 0, p = 1), which demonstrates that when
all prices are positive, a 10 change in prices does not have a significant effect on demand.
Only when one of the prices becomes zero does the observed perturbation take place.
Thus, we observe (hypothetical) behavior consistent with the zero price model;
participants reacted to the free Hershey's as if it had additional value.
*** Figure 2 ***
4.2. Experiment 2: Real Purchases
Although the results of Experiment 1 suggest that consumers react to a price
decease to zero differently than they do to other price reductions, their reaction pertains
to a hypothetical situation, which means that it remains an open question whether
consumers will behave in the same way when faced with real transactions. As a
secondary goal, Experiment 2 includes another condition to test the robustness of the zero
price effect. In this condition, the price reduction is much larger for the high-end candy,
which gives participants a greater incentive to make choices opposite to the predictions of
the zero price effect. Furthermore, this unequal price reduction provides a test of the
notion that consumers divide, rather than subtract, costs and benefits (as we discuss
subsequently).
Method. Three hundred ninety-eight subjects took part in the experiment. We use
a Hershey's as the low-value product and a Lindt truffle (hereafter, "Lindt") as the high-
value product. The experiment includes a free condition (0&14), a cost condition (1& 15),
and a second free condition (0&10). In the 0&14 and 0&10 conditions, the price of
Hershey's is 00, and the price of Lindt is 140 and 100, respectively. In the 1&15
condition, the price of Hershey's is 10 , and the price of Lindt is 150.
A booth in MIT's student center contained two cardboard boxes full of chocolates
and a large upright sign that read "one chocolate per person." Next to each box of
chocolates was a sign lying flat on the table that indicated the price of the chocolate in
that condition. The flat signs could not be read from a distance, and the prices were
visible only to those standing close to the booth. We use the flat signs because we want to
measure the demand distributions, including the number of people who considered the
offer and decided not to partake. By placing the price signs flat next to the chocolates, we
could code each person who looked at the prices but did not stop or purchase and classify
them as "nothing."
Although field experiments have many advantages, this particular setup suffers a
limitation in that the experimental conditions could not be randomized for each subject;
instead we alternated the price signs (conditions) approximately every 45 minutes. When
replacing the signs, we wanted to reduce the chance that students would notice the
change (which would mix within- and between-subjects designs) and therefore instituted
15-minute breaks between each of the 30-minute experimental sessions.
Results and Discussion. As we show in Figure 3, the results are similar to the
hypothetical choices in Experiment 1. As the prices decrease from the 1& 15 condition to
the 0&14 condition, demand for Hershey's increases substantially (t(263) = 5.6, p <
0.001), while demand for Lindt decreases substantially (t(238) = -3.2, p < 0.01). In
addition, we find no significant difference between the demand for Hershey's between
the 0&14 and 0&10 conditions (t(263) = 0.5, p = 0.64) and a marginally significant
difference in demand for the Lindt between the 0&14 and 0&10 conditions (t(271) = 1.5,
p = 0.13). This marginal difference, however, is in the opposite direction of the expected
effect of a price decrease on demand, which may be related to the higher number of
participants who took nothing in the 0&10 condition. Together, these results show that
the reduction of a price to zero is more powerful than a five-times larger price reduction
that remains within the range of positive prices.
A somewhat surprisingly large proportion of people selected "nothing." This
observed lack of interest could be due to the way we coded the choice of nothing; some
people who might not even have noticed the offers (and thus effectively were not part of
the experiment) could have been misclassified as buying nothing (instead of being
considered nonparticipants). Another possible contributor to the choice of nothing could
be transaction costs; buying a chocolate or even taking a free chocolate requires attention
and time. Finally, in the experimental setting, the value of chocolate may have been
either not positive or not sufficiently large for our participants.
If we take those whom we coded as nothing out of the analysis, the share of
Hershey's increases from 27% in the 1 & 15 condition to 69% in the 0& 14 condition and
to 64% in the 0&10 condition. The demand for Lindt shows a complementary pattern:
decreasing from 73% in the 1&15 condition to 31% in the 0&14 condition and 36% in
the 0&10 condition. The difference between the cost and the free conditions is
statistically significant (both ps < 0.001), but the difference between the two free
conditions is insignificant (t(142) = -1.0, p = 0.31).
In summary, the results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that valuations of free goods
increase beyond their cost-benefit differences, as we show with real transactions in a
field setting, and even when the price decrease for the high-value product is substantially
larger than that of the low-value product. The observed drop in demand for the high-
value good in such a case (from the 1&15 condition to the 0&10 condition) is
theoretically even more impossible than in the case when prices decrease by the same
amount.
Another advantage of the comparison of the 0& 10, 0& 14, and 1 & 15 conditions is
that it sheds some light on the possibility that rather than evaluating options on the basis
of their cost-benefit difference, consumers might consider goods on the basis of the ratio
of benefits to costs (not a normative account). According to this interpretation, the net
value of a free good is very high (strictly speaking, infinite) and therefore leads to the
choice of the free good. However, the results of Experiment 2 weaken the possibility of
this explanation in two ways. First, if our participants followed a strict ratio rule, and if
we assume that everyone has at least an epsilon valuation for Hershey's, the choice share
of the free chocolate should have been 100%, or at least 100% of those selecting any
chocolate, which is not the case. Second, a less strict version of the ratio rule implies that
the price reduction of the high-end chocolate from 150 to 100 (a 33% reduction) should
have had a much larger effect on its share compared with the price reduction from 150 to
140 (a 7% reduction). This prediction does not bear out; there is no real difference in the
changes in demand when the prices fall from 1 & 15 to 0& 14 on the one hand and to 0& 10
on the other hand.
**o Figure 3 *oo
4.3. Experiment 3: Cafeteria.
We acknowledge a possible shortcoming of Experiment 2; namely, the difference
between conditions may not be confined to prices, such that the size of the transaction
costs associated with the three options differs among conditions. Taking a free Hershey's
or buying nothing means not only a zero monetary price but also no associate hassle of
looking for change in a pocket or backpack. If transaction cost is a consideration in our
setting, it could lead to a choice pattern that favors Hershey's when its cost is zero (in the
0& 14 and 0& 10 conditions), but not when both options involve a positive cost and hence
a larger transaction cost (the 1&15 condition). We derive an initial indication that
transaction cost is not the driver of the effect from the results pertaining to the
hypothetical choices in Experiment 1. Because Experiment 1 does not involve real
transactions, it does not involve any transaction costs, which implies the results will
survive a situation without transaction costs. However, though these results are
indicative, when respondents made their hypothetical choices, they might have
considered transaction costs that would have been present if the choice they were facing
had been real. Because the results of Experiment 1 cannot be interpreted conclusively and
because transaction costs could be an important alternative explanation, we conduct
Experiment 3, designed explicitly to control for possible differences in transaction costs.
In this experiment, we hold the physical transaction costs constant for the three choices
(high- and low-value chocolates and no purchase) and between the cost and free
conditions.
Method. We carried out this experiment as part of a regular promotion at one of
MIT's cafeterias, using customers who were already buying products at the cafeteria and
adding the cost of the chocolate to their bill as if it were any other purchase. By adding
the cost to an existing purchase, we create a situation in which the chocolate purchase
does not add anything to the transaction costs in terms of taking out one's wallet, looking
for money, paying, and so forth.
The procedure of the experiment is generally similar to that used in Experiment 2:
a box with two compartments, one containing Hershey's and the other containing Lindt,
appeared next to the cashier. A large sign read "one chocolate per person," and we posted
the price of each chocolate next to each compartment (varying across conditions).
Customers who wanted one of the chocolates had its cost added to their bill. Thus, the
transaction costs in terms of payment remained the same whether a customer purchased a
chocolate, got a chocolate for free, or purchased nothing, because he or she still had to
pay for the main purchase.
We manipulated the prices at two levels: 10 for Hershey's and 140 for Lindt in
the cost condition, and 0 and 130, respectively, in the free condition. We switched the
price signs (conditions) approximately every 40 minutes, with a 10-minute break between
the experimental sessions. In this setting, it was difficult to separate customers who
decided not to participate from those who did not notice the offer; therefore, all
customers who passed by the cashier and did not select any of our chocolates were coded
as "nothing." In total, 232 customers took part in this experiment.
Results and Discussion. As we show in Figure 4, in the condition in which
Hershey's is free, the demand for Hershey's increases substantially (t(189) = 4.7, p <
0.001), while the demand for Lindt decreases substantially (t(206) = -3.2, p = 0.001). If
we remove those whom we code as nothing from the analysis, the share of Hershey's
increases from 21% in the 1 & 14 condition to 71% in the 0& 13 condition, whereas the
share of Lindt decreases from 79% in the 1 & 14 condition to 29% in the 0& 13 condition
(t(92) = 5.6, p < 0.0001).
Thus, the zero price effect is not eliminated when transaction costs are the same
for all options and in both conditions, which provides strong evidence that the zero price
effect is not produced solely by a difference in transaction costs.
*** Figure 4 ***
4.4. Summary of the Initial Experiments
These initial experiments contrast the choices respondents make when the prices
for both options are positive relative to a case in which both options are discounted by the
same amount, such that the cheaper option becomes free. This methodology enables us to
examine the reaction to free offers and indicates both an increase in demand for the
cheaper product and a decrease in demand for the more expensive product, an effect we
term the zero price effect.
Experiment 1 demonstrates that a 1¢ difference in price has an enormous
influence on demands if it represents a difference between a positive and zero prices but
not when it is a difference between two positive prices. Participants reacted as if a free
Hershey's had more intrinsic value than a positively priced Hershey's. Experiment 2
validates this finding with real choices and argues against the ratio explanation. Finally,
Experiment 3 demonstrates that the zero price effect is not driven by transaction costs.
Thus, we show that for prices, as for many other domains, zero is treated qualitatively
differently from other numbers.
When we consider how zero might differ from other numbers, we posit two
general answers: The first relies on the proposed model and assumes a unique benefit of
the price of zero, which leads to a demand discontinuity at zero. A second approach is to
model this process with a concave utility of money. In such a model, instead of
evaluating options by V - P (i.e., value minus price), consumers evaluate them by V -
v(P), where v is the prospect theory value function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). To
illustrate this point, consider the choices from Experiment 3: If the net benefit of a
chocolate is defined by V - v(P), participants could switch from Lindt to Hershey's
because v(140) - v(130) < v(10). The utility of money is likely to be generally concave
(Kahenman and Tversky 1979), so the question for our purposes is not whether it is
concave but rather whether concavity may account for our findings. Moreover, the
discontinuity in zero that we propose represents a special case of concavity; a function
that is zero at zero and then "jumps" and is upward sloping and linear (or concave) is by
definition concave. Our question therefore pertains to whether the effect of the price of
zero is captured better by a continuous or discontinuous concave utility of money.
To examine the possibility that continuous concavity could be sufficient to
account for the results, we consider the contrast between the two price reductions in
Experiment 1: from 2&27 to 1&26 and from 1&26 to 0&25. A model claiming that a
continuous concave utility function of money can account for the results would assume
that consumers evaluate the options by V - v(P), that v(260) - v(250) < v(l ), and that this
difference is sufficient to explain the large zero price effect documented in Experiment 1.
However, this model would have to assume also that v(270) - v(260) < v(20) - v(l0), and
thus, we should expect an increase in demand for Hershey's and a decrease in demand for
Ferrero in the 1&26 versus the 2&27 condition. Such demand changes should be smaller
in magnitude than those between 1&26 and 0&25, but they would occur in the same
direction. However, as we show in Figure 2, the results do not indicate anything of the
kind. Although concavity is present in the utility of money, the type of concavity in our
setting is more likely to exist because of a discontinuity at zero rather than continuous
concavity alone (we provide further support for the discontinuous nature of the zero price
in the Amazon gift certificates experiment and a flat screen televisions experiment
described later).
5. Why Is Zero Price Special?
In the first part of this article, we demonstrate that zero price has a special role in
consumers' cost-benefit analysis. In this section, we take another step toward exploring
the psychology behind the zero price effect. In particular, we consider three possible
explanations, which we label "social norms," "mapping difficulty," and "affect." On the
basis of prior research and an additional study, we argue that the social norms
explanation, though applicable in some cases, cannot account fully for the zero price
effect, so we focus on distinguishing between the mapping difficulty and affect accounts.
Overall, the results support the role of affect as a main cause for the effect of zero.
5.1. Social Norms
A possible psychological mechanism that could underlie the zero price effect
deals with the norms that might accompany free products. Costly options invoke market
exchange norms, whereas free products invoke norms of social exchange (Fiske 1992,
McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003, McGraw and Tetlock 2005). Thus, evoked social
norms may create higher value for the product in question. Heyman and Ariely (2004)
offer one example in which they demonstrate that people are likely to exert higher effort
under a social contract (no monetary amounts) than when small or medium monetary
amounts are mentioned. Another example of the relationship between social and
exchange norms appears in Ariely, Gneezy, and Haruvy's (2006) research, in which they
examine the behavior of persons faced with a large box of candies and an offer to receive
the candy either for free or for a nominal price (10 or 5¢). Not surprisingly, when the cost
is zero, many more students take candy than when the price is positive. More interesting,
when the price is zero, the majority of the students take one and only one candy, while
those who pay to take candy take a much larger amount (effectively creating lower
demand as prices decrease).
Together, these results suggest that social norms are more likely to emerge when
price is not a part of the exchange, which could increase the valuation for a good and, in
our experiments, increase the market share of the free chocolate. However, another
condition in Heyman and Ariely's (2004) experiments suggests that the effect of social
norms might not apply to our settings. When the elements of both social exchanges (e.g.,
a gift) and monetary exchanges occur (e.g., "Here is a 500 candy bar"), the results are
very similar to those of a monetary exchange and different from those of a social
exchange. Relating these findings to our setting suggests that it is highly unlikely
participants apply social exchange norms to one option in the choice set (free option) and
monetary exchange norms to the other (cost option). Instead, participants probably apply
the same set of norms to all choices in the set and thereby eliminate the effect of social
exchange norms.
To test the ability of social exchange norms to account for the zero price effect
further, we create an additional condition that enables us to disassociate the free cost
from the social norms invoked by the lack of cost. That is, we offer the low-value
chocolate for a small negative price (-10), which creates a transaction with no downside
(no financial cost) but still mentions money and thus presumably does not invoke social
exchange norms. To the extent that the zero price effect is due to the social nature of
nonmonetary exchanges, a negative price, which has no social aspect, should not induce
an increase in the intrinsic valuation of the products in the same way zero price does.
However, if the zero price effect is not due to social exchange norms, demand in this
condition should be very similar to that in the free condition.
Three hundred forty-two subjects took part in this experiment, which replicates
the 1&14 and 0&13 conditions of Experiment 2 with the addition of a -1&12 condition,
in which the price of Hershey's is -10 (participants received Hershey's plus a penny) and
the price of Lindt is 12¢. The demands in the 1&14 and 0&13 conditions replicate our
previous findings: Compared with the 1&14 condition, the demand for Hershey's in the
0&13 condition increases substantially from 15% to 34% (t(193) = 3.4, p < 0.001), and
the demand for Lindt decreases substantially from 38% to 16% (t(212) = -3.8, p < 0.001).
Of greater significance, we find that when prices drop from 0& 13 to -1 & 12, the demand
for Lindt remains 16% (t(220) = 0.04, p = 0.97), but the demand for Hershey's increases
from 34% to 50% (t(212) = -3.8, p < 0.001). Thus, in contrast with the social exchange
norms explanation, the zero price effect remains even when we mention money for both
options in the choice set. These results also suggest that a change in the cost-benefit
analysis likely causes the shift in evaluations for the free (or small negative cost) product.
5.2. Mapping Difficulty
A second possible psychological mechanism that might explain the overemphasis
on free options comes from the findings of Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003, 2006),
Hsee et al. (2003), and Nunes and Park (2003), which demonstrate that people have
difficulty mapping the utility they expect to receive from hedonic consumption into
monetary terms. In one set of studies that illustrates this mapping difficulty, Ariely,
Lowenstein, and Prelec (2003) demonstrate that maximum willingness to pay (elicited by
an incentive-compatible procedure) is susceptible to anchoring with an obviously
irrelevant number-the last two digits of a social security number (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974; Chapman and Johnson 1999). For example, students whose last two
digits of their social security numbers were in the bottom 20% of a distribution priced a
bottle of 1998 Cotes du Rhone wine at $8.64 on average, whereas those whose last two
digits were in the top 20% priced the same bottle at $27.91 (see also Simonsohn and
Lowenstein 2006). These results suggest it is difficult for decision makers to use their
internal evaluations for products, so they resort to the use of external cues to come up
with their valuations.
Mapping difficulty could play a role in our setting as well. To the extent that
evaluating the utility of a piece of chocolate in monetary terms is difficult, consumers
might resort to a strategy that assures them of at least some positive surplus. Specifically,
receiving a piece of the lower-value chocolate for free must involve positive net gain, but
paying for a piece of the higher-value chocolate may or may not. To illustrate, imagine a
situation in which a consumer's valuation for the lower-value chocolate is somewhere
between 1 and 50 and his or her valuation for the higher-value chocolate is between 100
and 200. If this consumer were faced with the 1&14 condition, it would be unclear which
of the options would give him or her a net benefit or the higher net benefit. However, the
same consumer facing a 0& 13 condition easily recognizes that the free option definitely
provides a net benefit, so the consumer chooses that option. Thus, the zero price effect
might be attributed, according to this perspective, to the uncertainty surrounding the
overall benefit associated with costly options and the contrasting certainty about overall
benefits associated with free options.
5.3. Affect
A third possible psychological mechanism that might account for the zero price
effect pertains to affect, such that options with no downside (no cost) invoke a more
positive affective response; to the extent that consumers use this affective reaction as a
decision-making cue, they opt for the free option (Finucane et al. 2000, Slovic et al.
2002a, Gourville, and Soman 2005). We test this prediction directly with Experiment 5.
The affective perspective also suggests the circumstances in which the zero price effect
should be eliminated: If the cause of the zero price effect is a reliance on an initial (overly
positive) affective evaluation, making a non-affective, more cognitive evaluation
accessible might diminish the zero price effect.
To test which of these two psychological mechanisms (mapping difficulty, affect)
is the more likely driver of the zero price effect, we conduct three more experiments. In
Experiment 4, we attempt to reduce or eliminate the mapping difficulty to observe
whether that diminishes or eliminates the zero price effect. In Experiment 5, we test the
first proposition of the affective account, namely, that free offers elicit higher positive
affect. In Experiment 6, we test whether forcing people to evaluate the options
cognitively, and thereby making these evaluations available and accessible, eliminates the
zero price effect.
5.4. Experiment 4: Halloween
Experiment 4 aims to test whether mapping difficulty could be driving the zero
price effect. Therefore, we reduce mapping difficulty by making both sides of the
transactions (i.e., that which participants stand to gain and that which they relinquish)
commensurable. We predict that to the extent that mapping difficulty is the cause of the
zero price effect, it will diminish when the two sides of the transaction match. We also
predict that this type of manipulation will have no bearing if affect is the cause of the
zero price effect.
Method. To reduce mapping difficulty, participants were able to exchange
chocolate for chocolate rather than for money. Specifically, on Halloween, 34 trick-or-
treaters at an authors' house were exposed to a new Halloween tradition. As soon as the
children knocked on the door, they received three Hershey's (each weighing about 0.16
oz.) and were asked to hold the Hershey's they had just received in their open hand in
front of them. Next, each child was offered a choice between a small (1 oz.) and a large
(2 oz.) Snickers bar. In the free (0&1) condition, they could simply get the small Snickers
bar or exchange one of their Hershey's for the large Snickers bar. In the cost (1&2)
condition, the children could exchange one of their Hershey's for the small Snickers bar
or exchange two for the large Snickers bar. They also could choose not to make any
exchanges.
Results and Discussion. As we show in Figure 5, the zero price effect remains
strong even when the trade-offs involve commensurate products and exchange media
("money"). In the 0&1 condition, in which the small Snickers bar is free, demand for it
increases substantially (relative to the cost condition), whereas demand for the large
Snickers bar decreases substantially (t(31) = 4.9, p < 0.001). A follow-up experiment
with adults, conducted at the MIT Student Center in a setting similar to Experiment 2,
includes the 0&4 and 1&5 conditions for exchanges involving Hershey's for small and
large Snickers, respectively. The results replicate the pattern of results of the Halloween
experiment.
These results generalize our previous findings in five ways. First, they
demonstrate that the attractiveness of zero cost is not limited to monetary transactions;
there seems to be a general increase in attractiveness of those options that do not require
giving up anything. Second, the results hold when the goods and exchange currency are
commensurate-in this case, chocolate-based candy (for other results regarding
commensurability, see Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003; Hsee et al., 2003; Nunes
and Park, 2003). Third, though a 1 price is not very common in the marketplace, the
choice and trading of candy is more common (particularly in the context of Halloween),
which adds ecological validity to our finding. Fourth, the results provide further support
that the physical hassle involved in transactions cannot account for the results. Fifth, this
effect holds for adults as well as for children.
*** Figure 5 o**
As a further test of the mapping account for the effect of zero prices, we conduct
another experiment in which both the products and the method of payment were money.
The two products participants could choose from were $10 and $20 Amazon gift
certificates (or "neither"). The prices for the gift certificates were varied at three levels:
$5 and $12, $1 and $8, and $0 and $7, respectively, with the $20 certificate always
costing $7 more than the $10 certificate. As the reader may guess, we find no differences
in demand patterns between the 5&12 and the 1&8 conditions (t(65) = 0.53, p = 0.6), but
demand for the $10 certificate rockets in the 0&7 condition (t(65) = 6.9, p < 0.001) while
demand for the $20 certificate falls to zero (see Figure 6). Thus, the experiment further
invalidated mapping difficulty as a source of the zero price effect; the effect survived a
situation in which the product sold and the medium were both monetary.
This lack of difference in demand between the 5&12 and 1&8 conditions,
together with the large shift in demand in the 0&7 condition, also argues against a ratio
account. The ratios of the costs are much more favorable toward the $10 Amazon gift
certificate in the 1&8 condition compared with the 5&12 condition (by approximately 3.3
times), so if participants actually used the ratio rule, we would have observed a large
increase in demand for the $10 Amazon gift certificate in the 1 &8 condition, which we
did not.
The availability of multiple conditions with both positive prices in this experiment
also helps us examine whether gradual price reduction to zero creates a continuous or
discontinuous changes in demand and hence whether v(P) is continuous at zero.
Continuous change would most likely, result in at least a slight difference between the
5&12 and 1&8 conditions, and a (potentially larger) difference between the 1&8 and 0&7
conditions. The observed lack of the former difference adds suggests that discontinuity of
v(P) at zero might be a better account for our data.
e.. Figure 6 ***
In summary, the main reason for our Halloween and Amazon gift certificate
experiments was to test whether the difficulty of mapping money onto experiences could
be the cause of the zero price effect. We first replaced money as the exchange medium
with chocolates, which presumably can be mapped more naturally onto other chocolates.
We then replaced the product and the exchange medium with money. The results
demonstrate that the zero price effect is not limited to goods-for-money exchanges and
that it is unlikely to be explained fully by mapping difficulties.
5.6. Experiment 5: Smilies
The affect account has two basic components. The first is that free offers evoke
higher positive affect, and the second is that people use this affect as an input for their
decision-making process. In Experiment 5, we examine the first component: People
experience more positive affect when facing a free offer compared with other offers.
Method. We asked 243 participants to evaluate how attractive they found an offer
of a chocolate at a certain price. We manipulated the offer on four levels among
participants: Hershey's for free (HO), Hershey's for 10 (H1), Lindt for 130 (L13), and
Lindt for 140 (L14). Participants received a questionnaire with the details of the offer and
a picture of the chocolate. At the bottom of the page, schematic pictures of five faces
("smilies") with different expressions appeared, varying from unhappy to very happy.
Participants were asked to indicate their feelings toward the offer by circling one of the
faces. If participants' attitude toward the offers reflected the offers' net benefits, the
attitudes toward L14 and H1 should be slightly lower than those toward L13 and HO,
respectively; and the difference between the attitudes toward L13 and L14 should be
similar to the difference between HO and H1. The affect argument, however, suggests that
the attitude toward HO should be much higher than that toward any other offer.
Results and Discussion. We depict the results in Figure 7. In line with the affect
hypothesis, attitude toward the HO offer is significantly higher than attitude toward any
other offer (t(113) = 7.0, p < 0.001). Furthermore, we find no difference among the
attitudes toward the other three offers (F(2, 178) = 0.35, p = 0.7). In support of the affect
idea, the free good elicits more positive affect than standard cost-benefit analysis
predicts.
Why does a free Hershey's elicit such higher positive affect relative to a 130
Lindt? Ex ante, it is possible that a Lindt at 13¢ provides a much better deal than a
Hershey's at any price. In fact, when people carefully consider the pros and cons of these
offers, they much more often come to conclusion that the value of 130 Lindt is higher
than that of a free Hershey's (see Experiment 6). But, as the results of Experiment 5
demonstrate, it is also clear that free Hershey's creates much higher affective reaction.
One reason for this could be that that the decision to take a chocolate for free is a much
simpler decision, and that simplicity could be the driver of higher affect (Tversky and
Shafir 1992, Luce 1998, Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Benartzi and Thaler 2002, Schwarz
2002, Diederich 2003, Gourville and Soman 2005). In particular, a free Hershey's
involves benefits and no costs, while a Lindt for any positive price involves both benefits
and costs - it is possible that options that have only benefits create more positive affect
compared with options that involve both benefits and cots. Alternatively, much like the
disutility of paying while consuming (paying for a vacation while experiencing it: Prelec
and Loewenstein 1998), it is possible that options that involve both benefits and cots
create a negative impact on affect due to the simultaneity of these two components, while
options that have only benefits do not include this "penalty."
*** Figure 7 ***
5.7. Experiment 6: Forced Analysis
In response to the high affective reaction to the free option in Experiment 5, we
test whether consumers use this increased affect as a cue for their decisions, which in turn
causes the zero price effect. In Experiment 6, we force participants to engage in a
cognitive and deliberate evaluation of the alternatives before they choose and thereby
make nonaffective, more cognitive evaluations available and accessible to participants.
We assume that in these conditions, participants are more likely to base their evaluations
on cognitively available inputs and therefore place a lower weight on the affective
evaluations. To the extent that the cause of the zero price effect is the affective
component, such reliance on cognitive inputs should reduce the zero price effect.
Method. Two hundred students filled out a survey in which they made a
hypothetical choice among three options. We also asked half the subjects to answer two
questions before making the choice. The design was a 2 (chocolates' prices: 1&14 vs.
0&13) x 2 (survey type: neutral vs. forced analysis) between-subjects design.
The survey in the [l1&14, neutral] condition asked participants to imagine that
there is a chocolate promotion at the checkout counter of their supermarket and that they
could either buy one Hershey's kiss for 10 or one Lindt truffle for 14g. Participants
indicated their preferred option (a Hershey's for 10, a Lindt for 140, or neither). The
[0&13, neutral] condition mirrored the 1&14 condition, except that Hershey's and Lindt
were offered for free and 130, respectively.
In the forced analysis conditions, after reading the introduction but before being
asked for their hypothetical choice, participants were asked the following two questions:
"On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (much more) how much more do you like the Lindt
truffles in comparison with Hershey's kisses?" and "On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7
(much more) how much more would you hate paying 140 (130) in comparison with
paying 10 (nothing)?" Participants circled a number from 1 to 7, anchored at 1 (not at
all), 4 (about the same), and 7 (much more). After answering these questions, participants
made their hypothetical choice among the three options.
Results and Discussion. We ran two logit regressions with the proportions of
subjects buying Hershey's and Lindt as the dependent variables and the answers to the
two questions as independent variables (forced analysis conditions only). Unsurprisingly,
preferring Lindt to Hershey's is related negatively to choosing Hershey's (z = 3.1, p <
0.01) and positively to choosing Lindt (z = 3.0, p < 0.01). Disliking paying more is
related positively to choosing Hershey's (z = 3.2, p = 0.001) and negatively to choosing
Lindt (z = 3.1, p < 0.01). Thus, participants' answers to the questions fall in line with
their choices.
Next, we performed two ANOVAs with the proportions of subjects choosing
Hershey's and Lindt as the dependent measures and the chocolates' prices, survey type,
and the interaction term as independent variables. The ANOVAs reveal significant main
effects of chocolates' prices (Hershey's F(1, 196) = 9.7, p < 0.01; Lindt F(1, 196) = 8.7, p
< 0.01), no main effects of survey type (Hershey's F(1, 196) = 2.0, p = 0.2; Lindt F(1,
196) = 1.6, p = 0.2), and, most importantly, a significant interaction effect for the two
factors (Hershey's F(1, 196) = 4.5, p = 0.03; Lindt F(1, 196) = 5.1,p = 0.02).
As we demonstrate in Figure 8, the zero price effect is replicated in the neutral
conditions (Hershey's t(97) = 3.7, p < 0.001; Lindt t(97) = -3.7, p < 0.001) but not in the
conditions in which subjects compare their quality and price options before choosing. In
the forced analysis conditions, the direction of the effect remains the same, but the
magnitude is much smaller and statistically insignificant (Hershey's t(99) = 0.7, p = 0.5;
Lindt t(99) = -0.6, p = 0.6). These results support the basic affect mechanism we propose,
according to which the affect invoked by the free option drives the zero price effect, but
when people have access to available cognitive inputs, they base their decisions on those,
and the benefit of zero largely dissipates.
Another potential interpretation of these results is that in three of our four
conditions, subjects act "rationally"-the two forced analysis conditions and the [1& 14,
neutral] condition. In the [0& 13, neutral] condition, however, they act on the basis of the
affect evoked by the zero price. In support of this idea, we find no significant difference
among subjects' choices in the three rational conditions (Hershey's F(2, 147) = 0.7, p =
0.5; Lindt F(2, 147) = 0.7, p = 0.5), whereas the [0&13, neutral] condition differs
significantly from them (Hershey's t(83) = 3.8, p < 0.001; Lindt t(83) = 0.3.7, p < 0.001).
*** Figure 8 o*o
6. General Discussion
We start with two models, one that treats zero as just another price and one that
assumes free options are evaluated more positively. We propose a method to distinguish
these two approaches and demonstrate in three experiments that the latter model is better
able to account for our findings. Experiment 1 provides the initial evidence of the zero
price model, and Experiment 2 supports the effect with a real buying scenario and
clarifies that the effect could not be due to decision making based on cost-benefit ratios.
Experiment 3 shows that the effect also could not be due to physical transaction costs.
After demonstrating the unique properties of zero price, we attempt to examine
the psychological causes for this effect and propose three possible mechanisms: social
norms, mapping difficulty, and affect. We discard the social norms explanation on the
basis of findings (Heyman and Ariely 2004) that the mention of price invokes market-
based transaction norms, which makes it unlikely that our scenario invokes social norms.
We further discredit the ability of this account to explain our findings using negative
prices that involve no cost but invoke prices. We then carry out three experiments to
explore which of the other two possible explanations is valid. Experiment 4 weights in
against the difficulty of mapping explanation, and Experiments 5 and 6 provide support
for the affective evaluation hypothesis.
In general, this research joins a larger collection of evidence that shows zero is a
unique number, reward, price, and probability. Although our results suggest that the zero
price effect might be accounted for better by affective evaluations than by social norms or
mapping difficulty, zero and the price of zero remain a complex and rich domain, and all
of these forces may come into play in different situations. In addition, other effects of
zero might include inferences about quality, changes in signaling to the self and others,
an effect on barriers for trial, and its ability to create habits. Therefore, much additional
work is needed to understand the complexities of zero prices in the marketplace.
6.1. Alternative Explanations and Boundary Conditions
One of the limitations of our experimental conditions is that they are restricted to
relatively cheap products and relatively unimportant decisions. Given this limitation, it
remains an open question whether the zero price effect occurs when the decisions involve
larger sums of money and more important decisions. To answer this question, at least
partially, we distributed a survey in which participants responded to one of four
hypothetical scenarios regarding purchasing an LCD flat-panel television. In these
scenarios, participants were entitled to a large discount and had narrowed down their
options to two: a cheaper 17" Philips and a more expensive 32" Sharp. The four
conditions varied in terms of prices, such that the Sharp was always $599 more expensive
than the Philips, and the prices of both sets decreased by approximately $100 across
conditions. From most expensive to least expensive, the conditions were 299&898,
199&798, 99&698, and 0&598. Comparing demand across these conditions, we find that
the results (n = 120) generally resemble our previous findings. Demand for the smaller,
cheaper television is 40% in the 299&898 condition, 40% in the 199&798 condition,
43% in the 99&698 condition, and 83% in the 0&698 condition. Concurrently, demand
for the larger, more expensive television is 40% in the 299&898 condition, 33% in the
199&798 condition, 43% in the 99&698 condition, and 17% in the 0&698 condition.
Overall, these results show that a shift in demand is apparent only when the price is
reduced to zero (F(3,98) = 3.24, p < 0.05); otherwise, the effects of price reductions do
not have a significant influence on the relative demand for the two televisions (F(2,69) =
0.06, p = 0.94), providing additional evidence against the continuous concavity argument.
Although these results suggest that the effect of the price of zero is not limited to
small prices and meaningless decisions, some thought experiments also imply it might
not be as simple with large, consequential decisions. For example, if we replace
Hershey's and Lindt with Honda and Audi and change the prices from $28,000 and
$20,000 to either $8,100 and $100 or $8,000 and $0, respectively, we suspect that
relatively small prices such as $100 might be perceived within a just noticeable
difference zone of zero, such that the effect of zero might be stretched to accommodate
this price. Thus, the question of which prices people perceive as zero might not be
simple, because it likely relates to the context of the decision and the original prices.
Another possible limitation of our setup is that our positive prices could seem
suspicious. People in general are not accustomed to prices of 10, 130, or 140, whereas
free samples often are a part of a promotion, which would make people more accustomed
to them. We selected such odd prices because we wanted to have a very small discount
(10), while avoiding alternative accounts related to accumulation and disposal of small
change across the different conditions (assuming that people are aversed to having many
small coins fill their pockets). At the same time, these odd prices could have evoked
suspicion, and our participants might have been making negative quality inferences about
the cheap chocolates (the ones with odd prices) but not about the free chocolates. Three
of the experiments cast doubt on this type of argument: In the Amazon gift certificates
experiment the perceived quality of the gift certificates was unlikely to be influenced by
price; in the Halloween experiment, all trade-offs were equally strange; and in the
televisions experiment we gave an explicit explanation for the strange prices: "Luckily
for you, you won a lottery that the store had conducted for its best customers. As a result,
you are entitled to a huge discount on any product in the store."
To test this "negative inference from odd prices" alternative account more
directly, we conducted two additional experiments. In one experiment we asked
participants to make hypothetical choice among Hershey's, Lindt, and nothing but this
time used prices that were less suspicious (0&15 and 10&25). The results replicate our
previous findings, with demand for Hershey's increasing from 8% in the 10&25
condition to 65% in the 0&15 condition (t(51) = 6.0, p < 0.0001) and demand for Lindt
decreasing from 45% in the 10&25 condition to 6% in the 0&15 condition (t(54) = 3.8, p
< 0.001 ). In the second experiment we described in detail the setup of the Cafeteria
Experiment (Experiment 3), and measured the inferences participants made about the
products. Half of the participants read the description of the 0&13 condition, and the
other half read the description of the 1&14 condition. After reading and viewing the
verbal and graphical descriptions, the participants are asked to describe their reaction to
the promotion in an open-ended manner, followed by seven questions in which they are
asked to rate the promotion on oddity and the chocolates on perceived quality, taste, and
expiration date (relative to the same brand chocolates from a supermarket). The written
protocols reveal that though participants mention that the promotion is odd (in particular,
because of the "One chocolate per person" sign), or that the prices are odd; none of the
participant spontaneously mentions the quality of the chocolates or makes any price-
quality inferences. In addition, the rating in the seven questions reveal no differences in
promotion oddity or inferences about chocolate quality (or taste, or expiration date)
between the conditions. In general, even though the promotion is seen as somewhat odd
by the participants, they do not make any differential inferences for the condition with
low positive prices vs. the zero price condition.
Even though the zero price effect does not appear to be driven by the oddities of
the prices we used, we do not assume that the price of zero effect will never interact with
processes relating to consumers' inferences about quality. In many market situations,
consumers might infer the expected quality of the product on the basis of such small
prices, the price of zero itself, or the availability of free giveaway promotions (Simonson,
Carmon, and O'Curry 1994).
Finally, the asymmetric dominance effect could offer another possible explanation
for our findings (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982). In our free conditions, the cheaper
product always weakly dominates the buying nothing alternative, because they share the
same cost (zero) and clearly differ in their benefits. In the cost conditions, no such
asymmetric dominance relationship exists. If the zero price effect in our experiments is
driven by the asymmetric dominance effect, the relationship between the option to buy
nothing and the cheaper chocolate (whether dominant or not) serves as the basic cause for
the effect. Moreover, if we exclude the option not to buy anything, the asymmetric
dominance relationship no longer exists, and any effect due to it should be eliminated. To
test this asymmetric dominance explanation, we conducted a survey (n = 136) in which
we excluded the buy-nothing option (which we could only do in a hypothetical choice
study) and contrasted the zero price effect with the case in which participants had the
buy-nothing option. The results replicate our standard findings: Free Hershey's
experiences a demand boost (from 28% to 92%) while Lindt suffers a demand decrease
(from 72% to 8%, t(50) = 6.8, p <0.0001), even in the absence of a dominated
alternative. Moreover, these changes in demand are basically identical to the case in
which the option to select nothing appears. Although the asymmetric dominance
therefore is an unlikely explanation for our findings, there are other context effects
ranging from product assortments to reference points in online auctions (e.g. Dholakia,
and Simonson 2005, Leclerc, Hsee, and Nunes 2005) that could relate to these findings.
Thus, we note that the more general questions of what context effects might be involved
and influence prices of zero remain open and interesting.
6.2. Managerial Implications
The most straightforward managerial implication of our findings pertains to the
increased valuations for options priced at zero. When considering promotions at a low
price, companies should experiment with further discounts to zero, which likely will have
a surprisingly larger effect on demand. At least one piece of anecdotal evidence supports
this claim. When Amazon introduced free shipping in some European countries, the price
in France mistakenly was reduced not to zero but to one French franc, a negligible
positive price (about 10¢). However, whereas the number of orders increased
dramatically in the countries with free shipping, not much change occurred in France.
This example also suggests that when trying to use bundling with a cheap good in order
to bring up the sales of another good, it might be wise to go all the way down with the
cheap good and offer it for free.
Another possible implication of the effect of zero might be in the domain of food
intake. When designing food and drink products, companies can decide whether to create
low caloric (or fat or carbohydrate) content or reduce these numbers further to zero.
Assuming that the effect of zero generalizes to other domains, investing further effort to
create a product with zero grams of fat might have a very positive influence on demand.
Decisions about zero might be more complex but also more relevant in domains
in which multiple dimensions can occur separately but be consumed together. In the
domain of prices, some examples might include cars or computers, for which price is
composed of a sum of multiple components, some of which might be set at a standard
price and some at zero. In the food domain, these components might be calories, grams of
fat, carbohydrates, amount of lead, and so forth, such that some offer a standard amount
and some are set to zero. To the extent that the effect of zero holds for individual
dimensions that are a part of a complete product, it might be beneficial to consider it at
such levels as well.
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Table 1: Predictions of the Standard Cost-Benefit Model and Zero Price Model.
Standard Cost-benefit Model Zero Price Model
Costs Both costs decrease by the same amount
Benefit of the low-value goodChanges in Benefits Both benefits remain the same increases
valuations
Net Net benefits increase by the same Net benefit of the low-value good
benefits amount increases more
Some switching from nothing to something
Some switching from high-valueNo switching between goods to low-value goodChanges in demands
Demand for the low-value good Demand for the low-value good
increases increases
Demand for the high-value good Demand for the high-value good
increases decreases
Notes: The table illustrates predictions as the prices for two products move from [Px, Py]
(where Px < Py) to [0, Py-Px].
Figure titles
Figure 1: Segments of customers who choose options X, Y, and N as prices go down
from [Px, Pv] to [Px-E , Pyv-], as predicted by the standard economic model with linear
utilities and the zero price model.
Panel A presents the demand distribution when prices are [Px, Pv].
Panel B presents the changes in segments of customers choosing options X, Y, and N
when prices are reduced from [Px, PY] to [Px-& , Pv-E].
Panel C presents the changes in segments of customers choosing options X, Y, and N
when prices are reduced from [Px, PY] to [0, PY- Px] under the assumptions of the
standard model.
Panel D presents the same changes under the assumptions of the zero price model.
Figure 2: Proportions of consumers choosing Hershey's and Ferrero Rocher chocolate
across the three experimental conditions in Experiment 1.
Figure 3: Proportions of consumers choosing Hershey's and Lindt across the three
experimental conditions in Experiment 2.
Figure 4: Proportions of consumers choosing Hershey's and Lindt across the two
experimental conditions in Experiment 3.
Figure 5: Proportions of consumers choosing small and large Snickers Bars across the
two experimental conditions in Experiment 4.
Figure 6: Proportions of consumers choosing the $10 and $20 Amazon gift certificates
across the three experimental conditions in the follow-up to Experiment 4.
Figure 7: Affective ratings of the four offers in Experiment 5.
Figure 8: Proportions of consumers choosing Hershey's and Lindt across the
experimental conditions in Experiment 6.
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Essay 2
Movies as a mood regulation tool: movie watching patterns right after September
11.
Abstract
Is a sad person more, less or equally likely than a happy person to pursue a "happy"
activity rather than an "unhappy" one (e.g. prefer a comedy to a drama)? Surprisingly, the
literature offers theories and laboratory evidence in favor of all three possibilities. In this
paper, we attempt to resolve the puzzle by moving out of the lab and analyzing the
changes in movie watching patterns following the tragic events of Sep 11, 2001. Two
data sets from the 7 weeks surrounding 9/11 are analyzed. One consists of US box office
collections of top ten movies during the period. The other contains data on movie rentals
in a rental store chain in Cambridge MA. The analysis suggests that the more private the
mood-regulating decision is (rental vs. movie going), the more likely is the person to use
the movie as a mood repair tool. When the decision is more public (movie going), the
appropriateness issues induce to mood congruent behavior.
Movies as a mood regulation tool: movie watching patterns right after September
11.
Enormous body of literature on mood regulation and mood congruency reviewed
in part below does not give an unequivocal answer to a simple question "what kind of
movie will you want to see when you are sad?" More generally, will you always peruse
positive emotions or, perhaps, you will be inclined to engage in activities in line with
your current mood, including doing "unhappy" things when you feel unhappy. In this
paper we will attempt to answer these questions by analyzing movie watching patterns on
and right after Sep 11, 2001. More generally, we will attempt to answer the following
questions:
Does mood regulation exist? When sad, will you watch a sad or afunny movie?
We will start with an overview of literature favoring various hypotheses with
respect to the second question. It turns out that all three possible hypotheses could have
merit; when sad, you could be more, less or equally likely as when you are happy to
prefer a happy movie to a sad movie. We then present empirical evidence from the
literature to demonstrate that experimentation does not resolve the problem, because all
three hypotheses are supported by experimental evidence. Next, we move on to our own
empirical evidence that includes two field studies related to movie watching patterns on
and around 9/11 to see if real life data can bring resolution to the puzzle.
Predictions
At the fist glance, everybody should want to be happy at all times. As Andrade &
Cohen (2007) put it, "[I]ndeed, 'hedonism's' prime directive - i.e., people's tendency to
pursue pleasure and avoid pain - is one of the most well grounded assumptions in
psychology and consumer behavior." Isen (1985) provides an overview of literature
demonstrating that "positive affect...tends to facilitate the recall of positive material in
memory," whereas "sadness does not facilitate the recall of compatible material." Isen
(1985) proposes that people in positive mood are motivated to maintain their moods,
whereas those in negative mood are motivated to repair their mood. Thus, independent of
mood, a person should be more interested in activities that make her happier. In case of
the movies, other things being equal, a person should prefer to watch a comedy than a sad
movie.
One might wonder, if people should only seek happy material, why do dramas
exist at all and why do people watch them? A possible answer is that the level of movies'
"happiness" is not the only dimension that enters movie selection; there is also quality,
educational content, and probably others. In this paper, we do focus on the happiness
dimension, however; and the first hypothesis that we will consider is the following
Hi: The preferences in choosing between a sad movie and a comedy will not
depend on the chooser's mood. Other things being equal the happier movie will
be preferred.
However, the need to experience something positive might be stronger at certain
situations than in the others. It is logical to assume that you need to be cheered up more
when you are down than when all is well. At the same time, when all is well, one might
be more tolerant to negative material, and it could be a good time to watch some high
quality drama. For example, Zillmann (1988) suggests that a person in a bad mood
"should be motivated to diminish the hedonic quality of this mood, to escape it altogether
and if possible to enter into the hedonically opposite state...Individuals in bad moods
should therefore be partial to consuming highly absorbing pleasant fare that features
activities with little affinity to their experiential state." At the same time, "[p]ersons in a
good mood are less in need of being cheered up. They can be expected to consume more
of the alternatives to comedy." So the next, possible prediction is that people in bad mood
are more likely to engage in mood-uplifting experiences than those in a good mood. In
the case of the movies, then, other things being equal, a sad person should be more likely
than a happy person to want to see a comedy rather than serious drama. Thus, the second
hypothesis to consider is
H2: A person in a sad mood is more likely to choose a comedy over a sad movie
than a person who is in a good mood.
An alternative line of argument, suggests however, that when your are sad, almost
anything can cheer you up, "the range of available activities would be almost entirely
more positive (or less negative) than the person's present mood", whereas when in a good
mood "most available activities would make the person feel worse" (Wegener & Petty,
1994). These arguments lead Wegener & Petty (1994) to put forward the hedonic
contingency hypothesis, stating that people in a good mood should put more effort into
mood maintenance than should people in a bad mood put effort into mood repair;
"scrutiny of the hedonic consequences of potential future activities should become more
usual, more practiced, and more likely in positive than in negative moods." This account
results in a prediction that a happy person is more likely than a sad person to peruse a
happy experience than a sad experience.
The same predictions can be derived from a different and unrelated account.
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), people experience losses
more intensely than gains of the same amount. Thus, even a small decline of a good
mood should feel more serious than a same size improvement in a bad mood; happy
people should desire to remain happy much more than sad people should desire to
improve their mood. Consequently, prospect theory also predicts that relative to a sad
person, someone in a good mood should be more likely to prefer a comedy to a serious
movie, because, other things being equal, the sad movie threatens the good mood more
than the happy movie promises to improve the bad mood. Thus, both these accounts
(hedonic contingency and prospect theory) predict somewhat counter intuitively that sad
people will choose a sad movie more often than a happy person.
Note that both these accounts are based on asymmetries between sad and happy
moods; in the first case, it is easier to loose a good mood than to repair a bad one, in the
second case, it is more desirable not to loose a good mood than to repair a bad one.
However, a third account with the same basic prediction brings symmetry into the
picture. This account simply states that everybody is choosing movies and other
activities in line with their mood. This proposition can be supported by numerous
consistency theories. For example, Caruso & Shafir (2006) write
"Affect can produce memories (Bower, 1981) and judgments (Isen et al., 1978) that are congruent
with one's current mood, and can ultimately predispose people to behave in affectively consistent ways
(Leventhal, 1980). Thus, all else being equal, when choosing between movies, people in a sad mood might
be expected to pick a heavy drama more often than people in a happy mood, who might prefer a comedy."
Thus, three separate accounts lead us to the third hypothesis
H3: A person in a good mood is more likely to choose a comedy over a sad movie
than a person who is in a sad mood.
Review of empirical evidence
As demonstrated above, various arguments and theories lead to three hypotheses
that exhaust all possibilities available. Sad people in comparison to happy people could
arguably be less, equally, or more likely to choose a sad activity over a happy one (e.g. a
drama over a comedy). Not surprisingly then, the empirical studies on this topic are
abundant. Problematically and surprisingly, they give support to all three hypotheses. In
the following three sections we review empirical evidence on each of the three
hypotheses. Given that the literature in general supports all three of them, it is no too
surprising that some of the papers actually support more than one, thus the split into
subsections is rather relaxed.
Evidence to support that mood valence has no effect of the choice of mood-relevant
stimuli (Hi)
The majority of experiments that we will review consist of a mood manipulation
followed by a choice of some mood-relevant activity (e.g. a movie) or recall of a
memory. The researchers are usually interested in whether the choice (or recall) will be
consistent or inconsistent with the mood. Caruso & Shafir (2006) use a similar
experimental paradigm but the question they address is orthogonal to the usual one.
Following Isen (1985), they suggest that because sad people "should" engage in mood
improvement, and happy people "should" engage in mood maintenance, mood valence
will have no effect on choices between sad and happy experiences, everyone should
choose the happy ones. However, when people are not paying attention to their mood,
they will not engage in any mood regulation activity, and thus they will be less likely to
choose a happy activity. Note the choices will not be different depending on the mood
valence, only mood salience is important, thus the predictions are in line with H1.
In a series of experiments Caruso & Shafir (2006) offer their participants a choice
between a high-quality serious dramatic movie (or audio) and a low-quality funny one.
Consistent with the author's predictions, the participants' choices do not depend on their
mood, but rather on whether their mood has been brought to their attention; those aware
of their current mood are more likely to choose the comedy. For example in Study 3,
participants are asked to choose between two audios; one is described as a low quality
routine by an amateur comedian, the other as a recording of a Nobel Prize winning poet
reading an excerpt from one of his most highly acclaimed poems. For half of the
participants, the choice is preceded by a rating of their mood in the end of an ostensibly
unrelated study. In line with the authors' predictions, those who were asked about their
mood before making their choice were more likely to choose the comedy, whereas the
mood rating for these people was not related to the choice. The fact that only mood
salience - but not mood valence - has an effect on the subsequent content choice in this
and three other studies in the paper favors H1.
There are several problems, however, for the finding to be conclusive. First, in
none of the four experiments is mood actually induced; moods are simply measured in
studies 2 and 3, and imagined in studies 1 and 4 (in addition, in studies 1, 2, and 4, the
dependent measure is participants' intuition of how they would behave rather than actual
behavior).
Obviously, people might act differently in an actual affective state compared with
an imagined one. A bulk of research on predicting behavior in an affective state shows
that these predictions are far from accurate. The findings on mispredictions of own and
others' behavior in a "hot" state while being in the "cold" state (and vice versa) have
been jointly dubbed "hot-cold empathy gap" (see Loewenstein, 2005 for a short summary
or Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003 for exhaustive
reviews). One can point, however, that this literature discusses fleeting and very intense
visceral states, such as hunger, thirst, sexual arousal, and drug craving, rather than less
intense and more lasting moods. However, lack of intensity can be only narrowing the
gap between intuition and behavior rather than closing it.
As for non-experimental mood measurement, it could be capturing even more
stable states rather than more passing moods. For example, if depressed people are less
inclined to watch a comedy than people who are in a bad mood temporally, then the
outcome favoring HI, might be masking what in reality is H2.
More support for H1 is provided in Andrade (2005). With similar pretext and
predictions as in Caruso & Shafir (2006), but with a somewhat better procedure the
results are also similar. For example, in his Study 1, participants are first put in a sad,
neutral or positive affective state (by watching a drama, or a documentary, or a comedy),
and a manipulation check is conducted (thus, mood was salient for all participants). Then
in an ostensibly unrelated study, participants are asked whether they would
(hypothetically) sample chocolates in a promotion in exchange for filling out a survey.
Participants are also asked whether they usually eat chocolate to feel better. The results
show that those who do eat chocolate for mood repair purposes (mostly women) are
equally likely to sample the chocolate whether they are in a positive or a negative mood
(more likely than in neutral mood), thus supporting H1. Similarly in Study 2 participants
in bad and good mood are equally likely (more than neutral mood participants) to refuse
to participate in a lengthy and thus mood-threatening survey. One problem that these
studies have is that the dependent measure is a reflection of participant's intuition on how
they would behave, rather than actual behavior. As with the independent factors, it could
be that mood effects are very different in reality than when predicted or imagined. For
example, when sad, you might think a chocolate would cheer you up, but given an
opportunity to have the chocolate, you might feel too down to have it.
Evidence to support of mood repair (H2)
Josephson et al. (1996) present support for both H2 and H3. Participants are
induced with a sad or a neutral mood by watching a video and then asked to write down a
memory, and when they are done, they are asked to write down another one. In line with
H3, sad participants are more likely, relative to participants in a neutral mood, to recall a
sad memory. However, when asked to retrieve a second memory, the same participants
with prior low depression scores are more likely to retrieve a happy memory and 68% of
those who do so "mentioned mood repair as motivating the recruitment of the more
positive second memory," thus supporting H2.
Complicating matters even further, Parrott (1993) suggests and provides some
empirical evidence that mood regulation can occur in any direction, including inhibiting
positive moods and maintaining negative moods, for reasons such as motivating hard
work. Parrott (1993) first provides a short overview of literature on mood congruence in
memories, with ample evidence that people are likely to recall memories congruent with
their current affective state. That is, a person who is happy (sad) is more likely to
spontaneously recall happy (sad) memories (in line with H3). According to the author, the
literature "depicts mood congruence as an automatic result of associational links between
the affective content of stored material and the present mood of the person." Next Parrott
(1993) provides empirical evidence of mood incongruent recall and proposes a mood
regulation explanation (in line with H2). In one study, students who have just received
their grades on an exam, are asked to recall three events from their high school years. The
first of the recalled events is on average much happier for "unhappy" students (those
whose grade was below expected) than for "happy" students (whose grade superseded
expectation), with no difference between "conditions" in the two subsequent memories.
Three other studies have similar outcomes. In one, students are asked to recall three
memories as they are entering the library. The "mood manipulation" is achieved by
approaching some students on a sunny and some on cloudy days. In another study, mood
was experimentally induced by music. In the third study with an additional neutral
condition, neutral participants place in between sad and happy ones. Thus, at least four
studies favor H2.
The author suggests that in all these studies participants try to overcome their
current mood by managing it with an incongruent memory. In addition to the natural
hedonic explanation for subjects trying to overcome bad mood, Parrott (1993) suggests
that subjects in a good mood try to overcome it in order to bring themselves into a more
serious state required by the situation (school, library, music evaluation). He also
suggests that previous results with congruent mood recall can be attributed in part to the
fact that the participants in those experiments are often asked to bring themselves in a
particular mood and probably keep working on that when producing memories. Thus,
overall, Parrott (1993) overviews results that can be seen as evidence for H2 and H3
without a final resolution in favor of one of them.
Evidence to support of mood repair (H3)
To start with, all the mood congruent recall literature (e.g reviewed in Parrott,
1993) can be seen as some evidence in favor of H3. Indeed, if people have better recall of
things congruent with their current mood, then their choice sets for behaviors will also be
in line with their current mood and hence the action chosen is likely to be in line too.
However, there is also more direct evidence in favor of H3.
For example, testing their hedonic contingency hypothesis, Wegener & Petty
(1994) give empirical support to H3. In their findings, happy participants have a greater
preference for happy movies than sad participants. In several experiments after various
mood induction procedures (e.g. watching/reading a sad, happy or neutral video/article),
student participants rank eight movies with respect to how much they want to see each of
them. The major finding is that the four tapes that are ostensibly rated highly on the
"happy" dimension by other students get higher rankings from happy than from sad
participants.
For example, in Study 2 participants first read a sad, happy, or neutral article.
Then they rank eight tapes according to how much they would like to watch each of
them. The tapes have been ostensibly rated by fellow students on various dimensions,
including "how happy the tape made students feel"; the average ratings are provided to
the participants as they are ranking the tapes. In line with the predictions (and in line with
H3) happy participants rank happy movies as more desirable for viewing than sad and
neutral participants (with no difference between sad and neutral).
In a similar study Handley et al. (2004) replicate this finding with the movies that
are not claimed to be happy or sad, but simply use in the titles, (neutral) words previously
paired with happy or sad words. That is, before the mood induction or the dependent
measure, the participants watch word pairs on a screen one at a time, such that one word
in the pair is always neutral, and the other is positive, negative, or neutral. This task is the
same for all participants. Then the mood induction with a happy, sad or neutral movie
and a manipulation check are performed. After the manipulation check each participant is
asked to rank-order 8 fictitious movie titles on her desire to see the movies. The fictitious
titles are partially composed of the neutral words used in the first task. "Half of the titles
contained two unique neutral words that were previously paired with two positive words
and half of the titles contained two unique neutral words that were previously paired with
two negative words." Results replicate those in Wegener & Petty (1994); happy
participants have more desire than others to view the movies who's titles' words were
previously associated with happy words.
In a somewhat similar experiment Zillmann et al. (1980) (described in Zillmann,
1988) also finds support for H3, although they expected to find support for H2. In the first
part of the experiment, participants receive false - negative, positive or neutral -feedback
in an emotion-recognition test. Participants are then either told that they are lacking an
important social skill or are praised for very good performance, or are said to be at the
level of most people (depending on the condition); thus bad, good or neutral mood is
induced. After the mood induction, during an ostensible delay in the experiment
participants have an opportunity to watch some TV; the available programming -
situation comedies, action dramas, and game shows - is prerecorded and played back
from an adjacent room.
In line with H2, the authors predict that participants in a bad mood will have a
strong preference for comedies, whereas those in a good mood will "consume more of the
alternatives to comedy." In reality, whereas good-mood participants are less interested in
comedies than neutral mood participants, contrary to predictions, sad-mood participants
are not interested in comedies at all. "Not only did they not prefer comedy, they clearly
shunned it." Zillmann (1988) explains the negative result by the nature of the humor in
the stimuli. "The predominant form of humor in the prime-time comedy is hostile humor
that thrives on teasing and put-downs...These subjects had just suffered failure and
belittlement themselves, and exposure to others' belittlement, although humorous, was
likely to perpetuate their annoyance." Thus, although it could be the case that with a more
generic mood induction procedure (i.e. recall of a memory) the results would be more
consistent with H2; as it is, we can say that the findings support H3.
To sum up, the question of whether people will always pursue stimuli in line
with their mood, or in the opposite direction, or whether mood valence does not matter at
all, remains an open question. In this paper we move outside the lab, and look at the "real
life" data. Two data sets are explored. Both data sets reflect possible temporary changes
in movie preferences resulting from the 9/11 disaster (Galea et al., 2002). The first data
set (Study 2) reflects US box office collections by the top movies. The second set (Study
3) consists of data on movie borrowing from a local movie rental store chain in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. However, we start our empirical enquiry by a simple
experiment looking into intuitions rather than behaviors.
Study 1. Intuition.
Before starting the massive collection of the real life data, we ran a short survey to
see what the intuition was with respect to the question "Depending on the mood, what
kind of movies do people prefer to see?"
Method. Three hundred thirty seven UCLA students read the following
"We would like you to indicate which kind of movie or movies you think that each of the
following people would go see given the kind of day that they're having.
Mr. A is having a very good day. Mr. A would likely go see a (circle all those that apply):
Sad movie
Happy movie
Comedy
Romantic comedy
Documentary
Other "
The question was followed by two similar ones describing Mr.B having a neutral day,
and Mr. C having a bad day.
Results. The proportions of participants (with standard errors) who circled "Sad
movie," "Happy movie," "Comedy," and "Romantic Comedy," and "Documentary" are
depicted in Figure 1. Among the movies that participants spontaneously suggested in the
"Other" option were the following (numbers in parentheses are the number of
observations for Mr.C/B/A):
1. "action", "action thriller", "action/suspense", "horror, action," "thriller"(10/10/17)
2. "adult", "porno" (3/0/0)
3. "anything"(0/0/1)
4. "drama" (2/2/1)
5. "horror", "horror, action," "scary" (5/2/8)
6. "indie flink" (0/1/0)
7. "none" (5/0/0)
8. "sci-fi," "sci fic" (0/1/2)
9. "Other" checked without any suggestion (3/5/1)
Given that the numbers were so small, no analysis was carried out with these data.
To compare predicted behaviors across moods, we run five logit regressions with
the dummies corresponding to these five movie types as DVs and the dummies for
"BadDay" and "GoodDay" as independent variables; we used robust standard errors and
clustered observations for each participant to control for the within subject nature of the
experiment.
Table 1 shows the coefficients, of these regressions with z-values in parentheses.
Note that all the p-values that are below .05 are also below .01, and thus the significant
coefficients will remain significant after the Bonferroni correction.
The regressions show that relative to people in a neutral mood, those having a bad
day are predicted to be more willing to watch a sad movie, and less likely to watch a
happy movie, a comedy or a romantic comedy. For someone having a good day, the
predictions are almost the opposite, except that the happy movie is predicted to be wanted
as much by a person having a neutral day. It is still true, however, that a person having a
good day is predicted to be more likely to watch a happy movie than someone having a
bad day (2(1) = 31.45, p < 0.0001). As far as the documentary is concerned, the person
having a bad day or a good day are predicted to be equally (un)interested in it (2(1) =
1.18, p = 0.28), and less likely than a person having a neutral day.
Discussion. The results seem to be mostly in line with H3, people are predicted to
prefer the movies in line with their mood.
Study 2. Box-office collections: Before and after 9/11.
The literature review, presented in the beginning of the paper offers contradictory
empirical evidence on mood effects on choice of mood-relevant material. One possible
explanation for the contradictory empirical findings is that each experimental
manipulation tackles only some aspects of mood at a time, whereas "in the wild," mood
is very complex and all its factors interactively contribute to the mood-relevant behavior.
Another aspect of lab results is that participants are allowed to choose among a limited
number of activities none of which could be what the same participants would choose
outside the lab for mood-regulation. Thus, both the manipulation and the DVs in those
studies suffer from lack of ecological validity. A test that involves naturally occurring
moods and naturally occurring choices of mood-relevant material might shed some light
on what the "true" effect is. For this reason, we choose to examine how the natural
decisions about natural mood regulation tools (selection of a movie in a theater or a rental
store) were influenced by a naturally occurring mood shift resulting from the tragic
events of September 11, 2001.
Data. The box office data were obtained from www.the-numbers.com. The data
contain US box office collections of the top 9-20 movies on each day between August 20,
2001 and October 7, 2001. That is, the range encompasses the week of September 11, as
well as three full weeks before and after. Apart from the gross box office collections, the
data include the number of theaters where the movies were screened, and thus the per-
theater collections as well. For most of the dates, the data were available for only the top
10 movies (only 9 top movies for September 9). To reduce selection effects, we excluded
all data for movies ranking 11 or worse from the analysis, leaving us with a total of 489
observations; that is 29 movies with 1 to 49 observations per movie (M = 16.9). Our main
dependent variable is the logged box office collection of a movie on a particular day.
In addition, we obtained "happiness ratings" of each of the movies in the data set.
Five independent raters were asked to rate each of the 42 movies in the data set on a scale
from 1 (not at all happy) to 10 (very happy) with regards to how happy an average viewer
would feel after seeing each movie. Four of the five raters were employees of a video
rental store; the fifth was a self-proclaimed movie lover and expert. The raters were
instructed to use their own viewing experiences for the ratings, or if they had not seen the
movie, to use their friends' comments, trailers, etc. They could also leave the rating blank
(only one rater used this option for only one movie). The Cronbach's reliability
coefficient for the five ratings is 0.79; the average of the five ratings will be used for
analysis (M = 3.96, SD = 1.62, min = 1.6, max = 8.2).
Analysis strategy. The major goal of the analysis is to determine how the dire
events of 9/11 influenced the movie-going patterns of the public, and whether this
influence differed for "happy" and "unhappy" movies. We explore two types of changes
that could occur. First, we are interested how the overall collections are influenced by
9/11, that is, did fewer people go to the movie theaters on that and the following days? If
going to a movie theater is considered a mood-lifting activity independent of the movie
type, then this question is important. A drop in the box-office collections on and after
9/11 could be supportive of H3; an increase could be supportive of H2. Second, we are
interested in how the movie going patterns changed differently for happier and unhappier
movies. For example, an increase in happy movies' collections and a decrease in the
unhappy movies' collections would be evidence in favor of H2, whereas the opposite
trend would be evidence in favor of H3.
To achieve the first goal, we put the logged box office collections of the movies
on the left hand side of a regression, and the dummies for 9/11 and the following days on
the right hand side to see how (and if) the overall collections were influenced by 9/11.
We also control (in this regression and in all later regressions) for the number of days that
the movie has been playing in the theaters, the day of week, and include the dummies for
September 2 and September 3, because the latter was Labor Day Monday (and thus
exhibited patterns similar to Sunday, while Sep 2 was a Sunday acting as a Saturday). All
the regressions also have fixed effects for movies, and robust standard errors are used.
The behavior of the 9/11 dummy and the dummies for the following days, will allow us
to see how the 9/11 influenced the box office collections in general.
To achieve our second goal, we add to the right hand side of the regression, the
interaction effects between the happiness score and the dummies for 9/11 and the
following days. These interaction effects will allow us whether 9/11 influenced
differentially the collections of happier and less happy movies. If these interaction effects
are insignificant, we will obtain evidence for H1. If the interaction effects are significant,
then we will obtain evidence for either H2 or H3, depending on the signs of the
interactions and of the dummies for 9/11-9/16.1
Before the discussion of the results, it is important to note that the gross box-
office data reflect both the demand of the public and the supply of the movie theaters.
The latter reflects to some degree the intuition of the owners on the movie theaters for
preferences of the public, and thus could also be of some interest in the discussion of how
1 Note, the happiness score does not appear as one of the regressors (only in interactions with the
dummies for 9/11-9/16), because it is already accounted for in the fixed effects.
the movie choices are influenced by mood. However, our main interest is still on the
demand side, and that is probably better reflected in the per-theater data. Thus for every
regression that we report, we run it with two possible DVs, the daily gross earnings and
the daily gross earnings per theater (both logged). We also run regressions (we do not
report them here) with the number of theaters where the movie was shown as the
dependent variables and the same independent variables. These regressions show no
effects of 9/11 and thus it is safe to assume that the effect we observe in the regressions
with box-office (overall and per theater) collections as DVs reflect the demand side, and
it explains why little difference will be observed between the behavior of these two DVs.
Results. The regression results are shown in Table 2; each column represents a set
of coefficient estimates in one regression with t-values in parentheses and the DV shown
in the top of the column. The first two regressions look on the impact of 9/11 on the
overall box office collections. First of all, all the control variables behave as expected; the
collections are larger on the weekends (e.g. Saturday brings approximately 168% more
than Monday), the longer the movie is out, the less it collects (every additional day
reduces the collections by approximately 5%), September 2 and September 3 did observe
larger collections than expected, given the days of week. The controls behave similarly in
all regressions, and we will not discuss them further.
The first two regressions also show that overall box office collections dropped on
9/11 by about 70%, 9/12 by about 16%, and by about 9/13 by about 20%, but not on the
weekend2. In the next two regressions, the dummies for 9/11-9/16 are interacted with the
happiness score. All the interactions are negative and all but one are significant; that is,
the happier the movie is, the less it collected on these days in comparison with unhappy
2 9/11 was a Tuesday.
movies. For example, on 9/11 every additional point in the happiness score reduces the
movie's collections by about 10% on average, which results in a difference of 60%
between two movies with happiness scores of 2 and 8. The last two regressions basically
show the same results but with a single dummy for all the days between 9/11 and 9/16.
Discussion. The results are in line with H3 again. It seems that the events of 9/11
made people abstain from happy movies and pursue movies in line with their sad mood.
Several technical issues with the data prevent us however from drawing the final
conclusions. First, the data analyzed include only the top movies as opposed to the
abundance of movies that were screened in that period. Although there is no reason to
believe that the top movies are not representative of the population with respect to the
patterns in question, it is still hard to make final conclusions based on a very small and
biased (in terms of the DV) subsample. Second, as discussed above, the data reflect both
demand for and supply of movies; although we are confident that the number of theaters
showing each movie did not change significantly due to 9/11, we have no data on the
number of shows per day - it is possible that the number of "happy" shows was reduced.
Finally, going to a movie is a public experience. People often go with friends, and the
choice of the movie is observed by them, other fellow movie goers, and the theater staff.
It is quite reasonable to assume that the decision to go see a comedy or another happy
movie on or right after a national tragedy might be considered as very inappropriate, even
if it is a good mood-repair technique. Thus, it will be fruitful to supplement our analysis
with analysis of a better data base. This is what we do in Study 3.
Study 3. Movie rentals: Before and after 9/11.
Given the identification problems in Study 2, the inferences we can make from its
results are rather limited. The movie rental data set in Study 3, on the contrary, reflects
the demand side only effects. In addition movie rental as opposed to movie going is a
much more private choices, made on more regular basis, and from a much larger choice
set. Thus, hopefully, Study 3 will provide us with more credible results and to some
extent, will let us compare how more private movie choices versus more public ones
were influenced by 9/11.
Data. The data were obtained from a Cambridge (MA) video rental store chain. In
the original data set, the unit of observation is a transaction (rental of one VHS, DVD,
video game, or piece of equipment). Each data point includes the date, title, category, and
consumer ID. The data used in the analysis consists of all VHS and DVD rentals between
August 29, 2001 and October 7, 2001. In the original data, the titles were categorized in
very many categories (categories used by the store chain), some of which were very
narrow (e.g. "Martin Scorsese"), so we use our own categories in the analysis. The two
that we will focus on are "Comedy" and "Drama." The former consists of the original
categories "Comedy," "British Comedy," "Classic Comedy," "Silent Comedy," "Stand-
Up," "TV Comedies," and "Woody Allen;" the latter consists of the original categories
"Drama," and "New Drama." When referring to categories "Comedy" and "Drama," we
refer to our broader categories.
Preliminary Analysis. For the initial analysis we collapse all data so that we have
one observation per day, containing the total number of movies rented that day and the
number of movies rented in "Comedy" and "Drama" categories. During the 49 days in
the data set, there were on average 731 movies rented per day (SD = 315), of which 108
(15%) are Comedies (SD = 54) and 100 (14%) are dramas (SD = 48). The analysis
conducted with this short data set is represented in Table 3; each column represents a set
of coefficient estimates in a regression with t- or z-values in parentheses. All the
regressions have the same independent variables, that is, the controls (days of week and
dummies for September 2 and September 3), and the variables of interest, the dummies
for 9/11 - 9/16.
The first regression is a simple linear regression (with robust standard errors) with
the total number of movies rented as the dependent variable. All the control variables
behave as expected; there are more rentals on weekends than on Mondays (e.g.
Saturdays observe 648 or 89% rentals more than other days, all else being equal), and the
Labor Day weekend Sunday and Monday resulted in more rentals than normal Sundays
or Mondays. Note, that there are more rentals on Tuesdays than on other weekdays,
because all Tuesdays are promotional days ("rent two for the price of one").
Turning now to the variables of interest, we observe that the total number of
movies rented on 9/11 fell by 150 (17% below a normal Tuesday) and was also below
normal on 9/12, but rebounded on Friday, 9/14, and was 263 above normal (24% above a
normal Friday) and remained abnormally high on the Saturday.
The next two columns of Table 3 represent two regressions (performed as
seemingly unrelated regressions) with the number of Comedies and Dramas rented as the
dependent variables. The pattern here is different from the general pattern. On 9/11 the
number of these movies rented did not fall significantly whereas on the following Friday
the number of Comedies rented increased by about 50% over a normal Friday and was
also very high on Saturday. For Dramas, the rebound did not happen till Saturday and
was significantly lower than for Comedies (the test comparing the coefficients for 9/14
and 9/15 between the two equations results in j2 (2) = 24.79, p < 0.0001).
The last two columns of Table 3 represent regressions (performed as seemingly
unrelated regressions) with the dependent variables being the Comedies and Dramas
rented as proportions of all movies rented. Interestingly, some of the controls are
significant in these equations, although a priori it is not necessary, that the proportion of,
say Comedies, should differ between days of week. The relative preference for Comedies
and Dramas increases on the weekends and Tuesdays, which probably means, that when
people rent more movies, the extra movies are more likely to be in the Comedy or Drama
categories, rather than in other categories. Turning now to the variables of interest, on
9/11 the proportions of Comedies or Dramas remained normal, however on 9/12, there
was a significant increase in the proportion of Comedies rented by 5.6% in absolute value
(which is 37% increase over the usual 14%). The following Friday, there was also a 3.7%
absolute increase in the proportion of Comedies rented (which is a 24% increase over a
normal Friday). At the same time there was no influence on the Dramas rented as a
proportion of total.
Discussion of the preliminary analysis. The preliminary analysis shows that on
9/11 and the following day, people rented much fewer movies than usual, but they
"compensated" and probably even "overcompensated" on the Friday and Saturday to
follow. We also find that in the absolute values Comedies and Dramas did not exhibit the
initial fall, although they did exhibit an increase on the weekend, especially the
Comedies. Finally, we find that in terms of proportions of movies rented, Sep 12 and Sep
14 exhibited a big increase in Comedies.
Thus the findings are mixed. On the one hand, because neither Comedies nor
Dramas, exhibited any significant changes in the absolute numbers on and right after
9/11, we might conclude that there was no mood regulation going all. On the other hand,
the results on the total movies watched reveals that perhaps people were watching TV
instead of renting on 9/11 and the following day, or simply found it inappropriate to seek
entertainment during a disaster. And at the same time, if movies were rented they were
more likely than usual to be Comedies, so for those who did get to the rental store, some
mood repair seems to be going on. As for the weekend, it could simply be exhibiting a
compensation pattern that has nothing to do with mood regulation. In order to get a
better picture of the data as well as achieve higher statistical power we now turn to panel
data analysis, which takes advantage of the fact that customer IDs are tracked in the data.
Panel data. For the panel data analysis we reorganize the data, so that there is one
observation per day per customer. Each customer who rented at least one movie in the 49
days of observation gets into the reorganized set; as a result there are a total of 10,312
customers in the data set. Each observation contains date, customer ID, the total number
of movies rented, and number of Comedies and Dramas rented (by that customer, on that
day). We also span the data set, so that there is one observation for each customer for
each of the 49 days. If there is no such data in the original data set (where an observation
is a transaction), we assign zeros to the three variables of interest (number of movies,
comedies and dramas rented) in the newly created observation. As a result we get a
completely balanced panel data set with a total of 505,288 observations.
Panel data analysis. On average, a customer rents .07 movies per day (SD=. 36,
Max=6), out of which 0.01 (14%) are Comedies (SD=.11, Max=5), and 0.01 (14%) are
Dramas (SD=. 11, Max=5). The regression analysis is summed up in Table 4. The
independent variables are the same as in preliminary analysis.3 In the first regression
(with clusters for customers and robust standard errors), the dependent variable is the
total number of movies that the customer rents on the day of observation.4 The controls
behave as expected. For example, on average, a customer rents 0.06 movies (or 91%)
more on Saturday than on other days. As for the variables of interest, on 9/11 there was a
decrease in the number of movies rented by about .015 movies (86% relative to a normal
Tuesday) and was still low on 9/12 with a rebound on the following Friday and Saturday.
It seems natural to assume that the effects are coming mainly from changes in the
probability to rent anything rather than in the number of movies rented per visit. To make
sure, we run a second regression where the dependent variable is a dummy reflecting
whether or not the customer rents any movie on the day of observation (the regression is
a logit with clusters for customers and robust standard errors). For the average customer,
the probability to rent a movie on any given day is 0.05 (SD = .21). The marginal effects
of the independent variables on the probability to rent and the z-values are presented in
the next column.5 The results follow the pattern of the previous regression but with
smaller relative effects. For example, the probability to rent dropped by about 0.7% on
9/11, which is a 9% drop relative to a normal Tuesday. This value is far from the 86%
drop in the number of movies rented, so we conclude that both the probability to rent and
the number of movies rented (in case there was any rent) dropped.
3 Other control variables that are appropriate in this case are those reflecting the consumer's behavior in the
past, for example, the number of days since last rental, type of movies rented last time, etc. We performed
additional analysis with these variables included in the regressions; the results were very similar.
4 This dependent variable is a count variable, so a poisson or a negative binomial regression is more
appropriate. We performed this type of analysis as well with virtually identical results.
5 Here and in all other cases, where the marginal effect instead of coefficients are presented, the intercept is
not included. In all regressions, the intercept is significant at p <.001.
Next we look at the differential effects on the "Comedy" and "Drama" categories.
The third regression is a multinomial logit (with clusters for customers and robust
standard errors). The dependent variable is the type of the movie rented by the customer.
It is not obvious, however, how to categorize the choices of the customers, because if a
customer has at least one rental, he or she often rents more than one movie on the same
occasion (M=1.5, SD=.8), and we have a problem if a person rents in more than one
category on the same day. We choose to use the following categories for the customer
choice:
* Comedy - on the day of observation, the customer rents in category "Comedy," but not in "Drama"
* Drama - on the day of observation, the customer rents in category "Drama," but not in "Comedy."
* Other - on the day of observation, the customer rents either in both categories "Comedy" and
"Drama", or in other categories
* Nothing - on the day of observation, the customer does not rent movies 6
The next four columns of Table 4 show the marginal effects of the independent
variables on the probability to choose in each of the four categories (with z-values in
parentheses). On 9/11 the probability to rent any movie (i.e. not to choose "Nothing")
goes up by 0.8% (13% over a normal Tuesday). The increase in the "Nothing" category is
mirrored by a decrease in the "Other" category, whereas the probabilities to rent in the
"Comedy" or "Drama" do not change. A similar pattern is observed on 9/12, with a
rebound on 9/14 and 9/15 in the probability to rent in general and the probability to rent
6 We also performed the analysis with an additional category accounting separately for the cases of renting
in both "Comedy" and "Drama." The results are virtually the same. In addition we performed a separate
analysis where only one, randomly chosen, rental per customer per day was left in the data set. The results
are also very close.
in comedies and dramas, with the effect for comedies being more pronounced than for
dramas.
As in preliminary analysis we now turn to the relative preferences for the
categories, conditional on renting any movie. Given that a consumer rents a movie, the
probability that at least one of the rented movies is a Comedy is 0.19 (SD = 0.4), and the
probability to rent a Drama is 0.18 (SD = 0.4). We now run a multinomial logit
regression identical to the previous one, except that all the observations where DV is
equal to "Nothing" are excluded from the analysis. The last three columns of Table 4
demonstrate the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability to
choose in each of the categories with the z-values in parentheses. In this analysis, 9/11
has no effect on the composition of choices. However, on 9/12 there is an increase of
6.7% to choose a Comedy (a 21% increase over a normal Tuesday). In addition, on 9/14
and 9/15 the probability to rent in this category is also elevated, whereas the Drama
rentals are not influenced at all.
Discussion. Generally both the preliminary the panel data analysis follows the
same pattern demonstrating that the effects of 9/11 on the movie rentals at the store
chain; the pattern can be split into three components. First, on 9/11 and 9/12 fewer
customers chose to rent at all, but reduction was followed by a rebound on the 9/14 and
9/15. Second, this general drop did not involve a drop in the rentals of Comedies or
Dramas. Third, ignoring the non-rentals, the proportion of Comedies rented was higher
than usual on 9/12, 9/14, and 9/15, whereas the proportion of Dramas rented stayed
normal throughout the period.
The initial drop and the later rebound can be explained in several ways. First, it is
possible that renting any movie is seen as an entertainment, mood-uplifting, technique
and that initially customers chose to abstain from renting in line with H3. The latter
rebound can be either viewed as a switch to a mood repair strategy in line with H2 like in
Josephson et al. (1996), or a simple compensatory demand. At the same time, it could be
the case that the initial drop is not related to mood regulation and is a result of
appropriateness concerns or just being preoccupied with other media (e.g. news on TV or
internet). The rebound on 9/14 and 9/15 could be viewed as a "compensating" measure,
but it could also be a mood regulating measure in line with H2 , if we assume that by the
weekend, it was already appropriate to rent (but not earlier).
The fact that the proportion of Comedies rented was elevated on three of the days
in question seems to have a more straightforward mood regulation interpretation.
Looking only at those who are renting, we are already looking at those for who the
appropriateness concerns are less of an issue. These people seem to be acting in line with
H2.
General discussion
The results of the first two studies clearly point in the direction of H3; people
choose or predict others to choose movies in line with the current mood. At the same time
the evidence from Study 3 is more complicated and could be interpreted as evidence for
all three hypotheses. No change in the absolute number of comedies and dramas rented
on 9/11-9/13 is evidence for HI; increase in proportion of comedies rented on 9/12 and
9/14 but no changes for the proportion of dramas rented plus a larger and earlier increase
in the absolute number of comedies rented on 9/14-9/15 than the corresponding increase
in absolute number of dramas rented are evidence for H2; finally general reduction of
movies rented on 9/11-9/13 is evidence for H3 if we assume that a movie rental is a
positive entertaining experience in general.
The increase in the number of movies rented on the weekend is hard to interpret
because it could be a compensation for the initial reduction, and is likely to be driven by
mood regulation than the initial changes in the rental pattern. For this reason, let us focus
the discussion to the initial changes. We can summarize them in three simple facts; the
total number of movies rented decreased, the proportion of comedies increased, the
proportion of dramas did not change. As mentioned above, we could interpret the general
drop as a combination of appropriateness concerns, substitution with other media and
mood congruence (H3). Let us now think of the behavior of those who did come to rent
on 9/12. For these people all the three reasons for not coming into the store are not valid,
or they would not have come. Thus, these participants self-select to behave in the
opposite direction (H2) and that could be why the proportion of comedies rented
increased. One question that remains unanswered, what kind of movie would be chosen
by those who did not rent on 9/11-9/12 had they found themselves in the store for
whatever reason.
One other factor to consider is an important timing distinction between going to a
movie theater and renting a movie. In the former case, you usually choose the movie you
will see before arriving to the theater, whereas when renting you often decide on the
movie when already in the store. Arguably, in the rental case, consumption is closer to
the time of choosing, and thus, the rental choice is a somewhat "hotter" decision than
choosing the movie. Comparing the results of studies 2 and 3, we might argue that when
you have to plan ahead in a more rational or cold state, you are more likely to act in line
with H3, perhaps in part for appropriateness reasons; however when the decision is hotter,
mood repair (H2) might seem as a more desirable option.
Another way to interpret the findings is to use the static and dynamic approach
distinction on how affect influences behavior introduced in (Andrade, 2005). The static
approach states that the affect people experience will influence their actions, but without
any regulatory component. That is, "positive affect is expected to lead to a more
favorable evaluation of the environment, which stimulates proactive behavior (e.g.,
increased consumption), whereas negative affect is expected to lead to a less favorable
evaluation of the environment, which inhibits action (e.g., decreased consumption)." The
dynamic approach is a mood regulation approach, stating that "people are likely to move
toward the goal of a more positive affective state when they feel bad but also that they
would try to protect a current affective state when they feel good"
Interestingly, Andrade (2005) finds support for both approaches. In his first
experiment (as described in the introduction), participants who think that chocolate is
good for good mood (mostly women) are more likely to hypothetically sample a
chocolate when they are either in good or bad mood condition, than in a neutral
condition, evidence of dynamic approach (trying to increase a bad mood or maintain a
good one). At the same time, people who do not think chocolate is related to mood
(mostly men) are less likely to sample in a bad mood than in a neutral mood, and more
likely to sample in a good mood, evidence of static approach (acting when feeling good
and abstaining when feeling bad).
It is quite possible that we also observe evidence of both dynamic and static
behavior in our Study 3. People who do not consider movie rental to be mood related,
abstain from renting on and right after 9/11; this is static approach, that is negative affect
makes you less likely to take an action. At the same time, people for who movie rental is
mood related prefer comedies over dramas on 9/12; this is dynamic approach, that is,
people are trying to use the movie to improve mood. Of course, these arguments are
largely post-hoc. In future research this possibility can be tested experimentally if we
somehow influence the decision makers' believes abut whether, how, or by how much
the movies to select from will influence their mood.
It is also important to point out that whichever way we interpret the findings of
studies 2 and 3, any generalizations should be maid quite cautiously. On the one hand
there is no doubt in how profound the effect of 9/11 was on mood and behavior. On the
other hand, it was a very special event, most probably quite different from other mood
influences. It was a national tragedy, widely covered by media and otherwise attention
drawing - everybody knew about it. Thus there is no way to separate appropriateness
issues from mood regulation. It seems quite plausible that the differential effects right
after 9/11 (general decline in rentals) and on the weekend (increase in rentals and in
particular in comedies) in the rental data can be attributed to the fact that early on, mood
repair was overruled by appropriateness, but later mood repair prevailed. The lack of a
similar pattern in the movie theater data can then be explained by the fact that movie
going is a more public experience and thus the appropriateness issues are harder to
overcome.
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One last aspect that we would like to speculate about is what the results would be
if the event were a happy one, rather than a said one, say the local baseball team won the
World Series. The only study in this paper that can address this question is Study 1
(favoring H3 - mood congruence), but of course, it has all problems of intuitions rather
than real moods and behaviors as both dependent and independent measure. Study l's
results suggest that after such a happy event people will try hard to maintain their good
mood and would be more likely to go for a happy movie. It is still possible, however, that
they would be in less need of consolation and more tolerant of unhappy activities and
their preferences for drama might increase.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Mood regulation is an important part of the market; alcohol, food, television,
movies, theatrical plays, books, amusement parks, shopping in general can all be all seen
as mood-relevant activities in the sense that consumer's choices within them and of them
can be influenced by her mood. The literature on mood congruence and mood regulation
overviewed in the beginning of this paper demonstrates that the experimental evidence is
inconclusive on the direction of this influence. If a marketer wants to base her decisions
about offering or highlighting a particular product on the expected predominant mood of
the customer (e.g. predicted by weather or news) she cannot use the experimental
findings, because they do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether a sad
person is more, less or equally likely than a happy person to engage in a sad or happy
activity (e.g. movie). We conducted a short survey and two field studies to resolve the
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issue. The findings are not quite conclusive either. Two out of three studies (Studies 1
and 2) point into the direction of H3 (mood matching), the third study points into the
direction of H2 (mood repair). Because the third study has more internal validity than
Study 2 and definitely more external validity than Study 1, we are inclined to conclude,
that absent of the appropriateness issues, when decisions are rather private, people are
inclined to try to improve their bad mood with positive material rather than avoid such
material for consistency reasons.
In retrospect, we think that the design of Study 1 could be easily improved by
implementing two separate versions, one about movie going and the other about movie
rental, to see how the privacy of the decision influences the outcome. Indeed, the results
of Studies 1 and 2 can be consistent (and inconsistent with Study 3) because they both
tackle the more public setting of movie going. To take the idea one step further, we can
even have a third condition, where the decision at question is the choice of the movies
that the decision maker already has available at home or a pay-per-view selection. If
privacy is indeed a factor in the decision, then the outcome for the rental should be
between those for a theater and the at-home decision.
However, as the literature review shows, the main question of this research can
hardly be resolved in a lab setting. This paper should be seen as one of the first steps of
bringing it into the wild. The next steps should consist of finding and better utilizing
other dependent measures (theater, library borrowings, TV-viewing patterns, etc.) and
independent measures (outcome of sports events, weather, etc.) to answer the question of
whether mood congruency or mood repair will prevail and under what circumstances.
One way to continue is to explore data sets, similar to the ones used in the current article.
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For example, one could analyze the movie going and movie rental pattern changes right
after the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, one could analyze the
movie rental patterns depending on local sport events (e.g. how the rentals in Cambridge
MA change when Red Sox win and when they loose), election outcomes (of course
assuming that Cambridge is pro-democratic), or local weather.
As far as experimental and quasi-experimental studies are concerned, it makes
sense to move them out of the lab as well. For example, one could manipulate the
customer's mood at a rental store or in a movie theater (or in the library, or in a mall) by
offering her a chocolate, or having a confederate making some pleasant or unpleasant
remark about her; and see how these mood-enhancing manipulations influence mood-
relevant behavior.
To sum up, mood regulation is a topic in need of more research, especially outside
the lab, and the privacy of the decision should be treated as a factor in future mood
regulation studies.
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Figure 1
Mr. C/B/A would likely go see
60%
30%
0%
Sad
Mr. C/B/A's day is
Happy Comedy
Movie type
U Bad El Neutral U Good
Table 1
Dependent Variables
Happy Romantic
Indep. Vars Sad Movie Movie Comedy comedy Documentary
Bad Day 0.88*** -0.59*** -0.8*** -0.45*** -1.06***
(0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18)
Good Day -0.82*** 0.2 0.48** 0.52** -1.29***
(0.22) (0.14) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19)
Note: z-values in parentheses; * -p < .05, ** -p < .0 1, *** -p <. 00 1
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Table 2
Dependent Variables
--- --
Sepl l_Hap
Sep 12_Hap
Sepl3 Hap
Sep 14 Hap
Sep 5_Hap
Sep 16_Hap
Sep 11 tol6_Hap
Constant 14.004*** 6.155***
(271.21) (122.46)
13.993"*** 6.144***
(268.78) (121.3)
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--
-0.091***
(-3.68)
13.989***
(271.36)
-0.096***
(-3.84)
6.139***
(122.32)
R-sqared 0.55 0.67 0.55 0.67 0.55 0.66
Note: t-values in parentheses; * -p < .05, ** -p < .01, *** -p < .001
Indep. Vars
Days
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Sep2
Sep3
Sepl 1
Sep 12
Sepl3
Sepl4
Sepl5
Sep16
Sep ltol6
log (Gross)
-0.053***
(-34.86)
0.235***
(4.53)
0.038***
(0.77)
0.07
(1.37)
1.257***
(23.8)
1.682***
(31.79)
1.243***
(25.68)
0.28***
(4.74)
1.231***
(17.78)
-0.705***
(-9.58)
-0.159*
(-2.55)
-0.206**
(-3.12)
-0.038
(-0.64)
0.047
(0.85)
-0.066
(-1.36)
(PerTheater)
-0.047***
(-31.6)
0.22***
(4.35)
0.018
(0.36)
0.05
(1.02)
1.263***
(23.96)
1.681***
(31.99)
1.239***
(26.34)
0.249***
(4.04)
1.225***
(14.7)
-0.703***
(-9.32)
-0.156*
(-2.28)
-0.211**
(-2.99)
-0.032
(-0.49)
0.053
(0.87)
-0.063
(-1.15)
log (Gross)
-0.053***
(-33.96)
0.234***
(4.49)
0.037
(0.74)
0.067
(1.31)
1.256***
(23.61)
1.681***
(31.56)
1.242***
(25.54)
0.278***
(4.45)
1.228***
(17.1)
-0.233
(-1.34)
0.186
(1.51)
0.176
(1.72)
0.207
(1.47)
0.198
(1.61)
0.15
(1.42)
-0.105**
(-3.19)
-0.077**
(-3.21)
-0.085***
(-3.74)
-0.063*
(-1.99)
-0.038
(-1.15)
-0.055*
(-2.03)
log
(PerTheater)
-0.046***
(-30.87)
0.219**
(4.32)
0.016
(0.33)
0.048
(0.95)
1.262***
(23.77)
1.68***
(31.78)
1.238***
(26.21)
0.247***
(3.8)
1.222***
(14.26)
-0.277
(-1.33)
0.143
(0.82)
0.126
(0.82)
0.295*
(2.03)
0.286*
(2.2)
0.234*
(2.16)
-0.095*
(-2.21)
-0.067*
(-2.03)
-0.075*
(-2.36)
-0.084**
(-2.61)
-0.059
(-1.66)
-0.076**
(-2.61)
log (Gross)
-0.053***
(-34.2)
0.164**
(3.12)
0.045
(0.94)
0.068
(1.4)
1.276***
(25.28)
1.713***
(33.77)
1.26***
(27.1)
0.265***
(4.31)
1.233***
(17.36)
0.193
(1.93)
log
(PerTheater)
-0.046***
(-31.04)
0.149**
(2.9)
0.024
(0.52)
0.048
(1.01)
1.282***
(25.5)
1.712***
(34.03)
1.257***
(27.72)
0.234***
(3.61)
1.226***
(14.46)
0.216*
(2.09)
Table 3
Regrl Reg 2 (SUR) Reg 3 (SUR)
TotalNumber Comedy Drama PropComedy PropDrama
Tuesday 448.83*** 69.17*** 69.33*** 0.009 0.019**
(6.09) (6.75) (8.07) (1.13) (2.87)
Wednesday -25 -1.67 -4.33 0.004 -0.002
(-0.51) (-0.16) (-0.5) (0.49) (-0.28)
Thursday 17.33 1.33 7.5 -0.002 0.012
(0.35) (0.13) (0.87) (-0.2) (1.8)
Friday 655*** 106.83*** 106.17*** 0.018* 0.025***
(8.51) (10.42) (12.35) (2.19) (3.83)
Saturday 648.33*** 98.17*** 99.67*** 0.012 0.021**
(9.25) (9.58) (11.6) (1.43) (3.19)
Sunday 227.67** 43.6*** 40.87*** 0.019* 0.023**
(2.96) (4.06) (4.53) (2.12) (3.44)
Sep2 327*** 27.4 51.8** -0.021 0.004
(5.18) (1.41) (3.18) (-1.35) (0.3)
Sep3 239.67*** 37 51.67** 0.008 0.035**
(5.45) (1.93) (3.21) (0.52) (2.85)
Sepll -150.17* -11.17 -9.67 0.016 0.015
(-2.54) (-0.58) (-0.6) (1.02) (1.2)
Sep12 -60.33** 10.67 -8 0.056*** -0.004
(-2.79) (0.56) (-0.5) (3.61) (-0.35)
Sep13 17.33 13.67 12.17 0.025 0.022
(0.75) (0.71) (0.76) (1.6) (1.81)
Sepl4 277.67*** 92.17*** 30.5 0.037* -0.006
(4.4) (4.81) (1.9) (2.34) (-0.5)
Sepl5 263.33*** 76.83*** 34* 0.028 -0.002
(4.83) (4.01) (2.11) (1.79) (-0.16)
Sep16 -9 -5.6 8.8 -0.004 0.013
(-0.14) (-0.29) (0.54) (-0.27) (1.07)
Constant 430.33*** 58*** 51.33*** 0.134*** 0.119***
(9.78) (8) (8.45) (22.65) (25.99)
R-squared 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.45 0.51
Note: t-values in parentheses in the first column, z- in the rest; * -p < .05, ** -p < .01, *** -p < .001
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Table 4
Reg. 2Reg. 1 (logit) Reg. 3 (multinomial logit)(logit)
Number of Rented or Category
moviesrented not Comedy Drama Other Nothing
Tuesday 0.044*** 0.029*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.016*** -0.029***
(18.75) (14.7) (7.57) (7.21) (10.72) (-14.71)
Wednesday -0.002 -0.004** 0.000 -0.001 -0.003** 0.004**
(-.1.56) (-2.84) (-0.33) (-1.4) (-2.58) (2.8)
Thursday 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(1.05) (0.2) (0.7) (1.25) (-0.76) (-0.31)
Friday 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.029*** -0.052***
(28.23) (23.3) (10.26) (10.22) (17.54) (-23.19)
Saturday 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.011"** 0.011*** 0.03*** -0.052***
(28.58) (23.65) (10.19) (10.19) (18.04) (-23.55)
Sunday 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** -0.022***
(1[1.6) (11.8) (5.92) (5.78) (8.4) (-11.89)
Sep2 0.032*** 0.016*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.01*** -0.016***
(7.23) (6.44) (2.35) (3.44) (4.85) (-6.44)
Sep3 0..023*** 0.026*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.014*** -0.026***
(6.83) (7.77) (3.31) (3.87) (5.59) (-7.81)
Sepl1 -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.001 0.000 -0.006*** 0.008***
(-3.85) (-4.28) (-1.18) (-0.44) (-4.41) (4.35)
Sep12 -0.006* -0.006* 0.001 -0.001 -0.006** 0.006*
(-2.29) (-2.52) (1.08) (-1.24) (-3.23) (2.43)
Sep13 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.56) (1.09) (1.24) (0.9) (0.18) (-1.13)
Sepl4 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.006*** -0.012***
(5.37) (6.08) (4.34) (1.84) (4.07) (-6.04)
Sepl5 0.026*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.007*** -0.012***
(5.25) (6.22) (4.21) (1.98) (4.34) (-6.21)
Sep16 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.003
(-0.24) (-1.28) (-0.29) (0.59) (-1.77) (1.29)
Constant 0.042***
(34.93)
(Pseudo) 0.01 0.02 0.02R-sq
Note: * - p <.05, ** - p <.01, *** - p <.001
Reported values:
Reg. 1: coefficients with t-values in parentheses
Reg. 2: marginal effects (on the probability to rent) with z-values in parentheses
Reg. 3&4: marginal effects (on the probability to choose the category) with z-values in parentheses
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Table 4 (cont.)
Reg. 4 (multinomial logit)
Category
Comedy Drama Other
Tuesday 0.032* 0.029* -0.06***
(2.46) (2.26) (-4)
Wednesday 0.011 -0.005 -0.006
(0.8) (-0.37) (-0.39)
Thursday 0.009 0.017 -0.026
(0.63) (1.27) (-1.58)
Friday 0.029* 0.032** -0.061***
(2.44) (2.72) (-4.32)
Saturday 0.023 0.029* -0.052***
(1.95) (2.49) (-3.7)
Sunday 0.023 0.02 -0.043**
(1.73) (1.61) (-2.78)
Sep2 -0.006 0.02 -0.014
(-0.35) (1.14) (-0.67)
Sep3 0.01 0.03 -0.041
(0.48) (1.4) (-1.57)
Sepl1 0.011 0.025 -0.036
(0.54) (1.28) (-1.46)
Sepl2 0.067* -0.01 -0.058
(2.17) (-0.36) (-1.66)
Sepl3 0.023 0.012 -0.035
(0.91) (0.51) (-1.18)
Sepl4 0.033* -0.01 -0.023
(2.27) (-0.78) (-1.33)
Sep15 0.031* -0.009 -0.022
(2.09) (-0.67) (-1.27)
Sep16 0.005 0.024 -0.029
(0.24) (1.18) (-1.16)
Constant
(Pseudo) 0.002
R-sq
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Essay 3
Measuring Liking and Wanting
Abstract
Recently neuroscientists have gathered a vast body of evidence that wanting (motivated
preferences) and liking (non-motivated prferences) are not one and the same. We explore
the possibility of measuring the two types of preferences uintrusiveley, in a behavioral
lab. In particular we find that wanting and liking for viewing pictures of attractive people
are not perfectly aligned and especially for men.
Measuring Liking and Wanting
Introduction
Measuring preferences can be seen as one of the main tasks for researchers in
both Economics and Psychology, but it has turned out to be far from an easy one. All
kinds of manipulations that should have no effect on preferences from the perspective of
microeconomics, in reality, lead to differing elicited preferences.
For example, matching procedures and choice procedures often lead to different
(actual and inferred) choices between the same two options (Fischer et al., 1999; Tversky
et al., 1988). In a classical example from Tversky et al. (1988) participants were asked to
choose between two programs reducing life casualties in traffic accidents. One program
would result in 500 casualties and cost $55M, the other would result in 570 casualties and
cost $12M. Some of the participants were simply asked to choose between the two
programs, whereas the others did not get the $12M number and were asked to generate a
number that would make them indifferent between the two programs. Whereas in the
simple choice the majority chose the more expensive program saving more lives, in the
matching task the participants suggested a price higher than $12M for the second
program, thus implicitly siding with the 570/$12M program, rather than the 500/$55M
one.
It has since been shown that in the simple choice more weight is usually given to
the more prominent (more important or more salient) attribute, than in matching; and the
effect has been labeled prominence effect. In the example above, lives saved is a
definitely more important and thus more prominent attribute.
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Numerous other preference reversal studies show that people reveal different
preferences in joint versus separate evaluations (Hsee et al., 1999), in particular, in
pricing versus choice (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971); other studies have demonstrated
preference reversals in selling versus buying procedures (Kahneman et al., 1990), and
numerous other cases.
Several paths have been traveled in search of the explanation of what seems to be
inconsistent preferences within one individual. For example, the lack of incentive
compatibility in many procedures used to elicit preferences has been blamed (especially
by economists) for preference reversals. However, at least two arguments suggest the
lack of incentive compatibility does not completely explain the whole set of reversal
phenomena. First, although participants in many studies do not have any incentives to
reveal their true preferences, in most they do not have any incentives to lie either. The
effort saving strategy of random answers would not result in the particular replicable
(biased) patterns observed in the literature. Second, at least some of the preference
reversal phenomena have been replicated with incentive compatible procedures
(Kahneman et al., 1990).
The most accepted view on preferences reversals, however, is that of constructed
preferences (e.g. Payne et al., 1992; Payne et al., 1999) . This approach suggests that in
many domains, people do not have articulate known preferences, and that in such cases
people construct preferences "on the spot," and the way these preferences are elicited
plays a major role in what the input for creating these preferences will be, leading to
procedural and descriptive invariance failures.
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The choice between the two life-saving programs is an example of procedural
invariance failure; two elicitation procedures that are theoretically equivalent lead to
contradictory preferences. Another famous preference reversal - resulting from framing
the options in terms of either lives saved or lives lost (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) - is
an example of violation of descriptive invariance; two identical situations described
differently theoretically should still lead to the same preferences.
The evidence for constructed preferences is usually based on the findings that
people seem to have contradictory preferences about the same thing depending on the
elicitation task and/or mindset. The constructed preferences view does not suggest,
however, that one person holds different preferences about the same choice. Rather, it
suggests that the person has one preference which is very fuzzy, and depending on the
starting point (framing and elicitation method) we will arrive to the same core preference,
but we will observe a different aspect of these preferences. That, is we approach the same
preference from a different direction, which is determined by the method and mindset
(see Figure 1, panel A).
For example, when participants face a simple choice between two life saving
programs in Tversky et al. (1988), they use a simple heuristic that life is more important
than money; al long as they do not have to say how much more important and what the
exchange rate is, they don't. However, when participants are faced with the need to
create an exchange rate between lives saved and money spent (matching task), as much
as morally demanding it is, they do come up with such a rate. In doing so, they do not let
go of their believe that life is more important than money. It is just that this preference
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has a boundary, and this boundary only is revealed in the matching task. That is, in the
two tasks, we observe the same preference but at different level of complexity.
However, an alternative way to interpret the evidence for constructed preferences
is simply to admit that there are multiple preferences within one individual and that
various elicitation procedures make different preferences more or less accessible. This
view does not assume arrival at different sides of the same preference depending on the
starting point and the path taken; rather it suggests arriving at different destinations; in
this view, people do not construct preferences on site, but rather reveal different
preferences depending on the procedure (see Figure 1, panel B).'
Recent advances in neurobiology suggest that multiple preferences within one
individual is indeed a very likely possibility. It has been shown that there are at least two
coexisting types of preferences in animals and humans, which have been dubbed "liking"
and "wanting." Although traditionally liking and wanting were considered to be two
sides of the same coin, that is, people were expected to want everything that they liked
(or thought they would like) and they were expected to like whatever they wanted;
recently neuroscientists started challenging this simple outlook (Pecina et al., 2003).
Originally, the dopamine system of the brain (the "reward center") was
considered to reward "animals for doing things with survival value - eating or having sex,
for example," (Phillips, 2003). However, recently Kent Berridge and his colleagues have
suggested that the dopamine system is responsible for desire rather than for pleasure (i.e.
wanting rather than liking). For example, dopamine depleted rats refuse to eat, but when
force fed they still display the proper taste reaction (Berridge & Robinson, 1998;
Berridge et al., 1989). That is, these rats like the food but do not want it. Conversely,
i Of course, some mix of constructed and multiple preferences is also possible.
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mutant hyperdopaminergic mice exhibit higher than control mice wanting of food but no
more liking of the food (Pecina et al., 2003).
Based on these findings, the dopamine system is being relabeled "desire centre,"
and the scientists are searching for the "real" reward center. And they do find various
other circuits in the brain that they deem responsible for liking rather than wanting
(Francis et al., 1999; Kelley et al, 2002). For review of the reward study findings see
Berridge & Robinson (2003); for a "lay" overview on the pleasure and desire research in
neuroscience, see Phillips (2003).
In humans, the most dramatic evidence of the dissociation of wanting and liking
comes from the studies of drug addicts (Robinson & Berridge, 2000). Originally it was
considered that the reasons why addicts keep seeking drugs were the pleasure of
administration and the negative effects of abstinence. This view basically states that
liking promotes wanting. However Robinson & Berridge (2000) provide compelling
overview of research that demonstrates that neither the negative withdrawal syndromes
nor the pleasure of administering drugs can fully account for drug addiction. Here is what
they write about the non-existent causality between withdrawal syndromes and addiction.
"[D]rugs that do not produce strong withdrawal syndromes, such as psychostimulants,
can be highly addictive. Conversely, there are drugs that produce tolerance and withdrawal
syndromes but do not support compulsive patterns of use. The latter compounds include some
tricyclic antidepressants, anticholinergics and kappa opioid agonists (Jaffe, 1992). Thus, as put by
Jaffe (1992) "there is little correlation between the visibility or physiological seriousness of
withdrawal signs and their motivational force" (p. 9). Another problem for withdrawal-based
explanations is that drug craving is often elicited by drug administration itself, in association with
euphorigenic effects, at the moments when withdrawal symptoms should be at their weakest.
Similarly, in animals trained to self-administer heroin, reinstatement
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of drug-taking behavior following extinction is more potently elicited by a priming injection of
heroin, which elicits a drug-like effect, than by the injection of an opioid antagonist, which
induces withdrawal signs (Sharam et al., 1996; Stewart & Wise, 1992). For human addicts, the
prolonged cessation of drug use, during which time withdrawal symptoms decay, is by no means a
guarantee of a cure, as relapse to compulsive use even long after withdrawal is over remains a
major problem in addiction (O'Brein, 1997)."
The authors then move on to the evidence that the pleasure of administering drugs cannot
account for addiction either.
"Perhaps the most compelling evidence against the idea that the ability of drugs to
promote drug-taking is directly attributable to their subjective pleasurable effects comes from
studies showing that subjective states are often poorly correlated with drug-taking. First, drug-
taking may increase dramatically over time as an addiction develops, but the pleasure induced by a
given dose of a drug is not reported to increase (see note 5 in Robinson & Berridge (1993) for a
discussion of this point). If addicts craved drugs in proportion to their ability to produce pleasure,
then craving late in addiction ought not to be stronger than craving after the initial drug experience
- but of course that is not the case.
Secondly, after pharmacological manipulations there is often a dissociation between the
reported subjective effects of cocaine and cocaine-taking behavior (Fischman, 1989; Fischman et
al., 1990; Fischman & Foltin, 1992; Foltin & Fischman, 1991; Haney et al., 1999; Haney et al.,
1998). For example, Haney et al., (1998) reported recently that pergolide decreased cocaine's
cardiovascular effects, decreased ratings of its subjective effects ("high", "stimulated"), increased
ratings of "I want cocaine", while having no effect whatsoever on cocaine self-administration
behavior. Similarly, Haney et al. (1999) reported: "that even a 50% decrease in certain of
cocaine's subjective effects by ABT-431 ... did not shift cocaine self-administration" (p. 108).
Along the same lines, Comer et al., (1999) reported that doses of intranasal and intravenous heroin
that maintained the same "breakpoint" on a progressive ratio schedule resulted in very different
subjective ratings of "high".
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Thirdly, it has been reported that people will work for low doses of morphine or cocaine
that produce no subjective pleasure at all; doses that indeed produce no reported subjective effects
of any kind (Fischman, 1989; Fischman & Foltin, 1992; Lamb et al., 1991). In summarizing their
findings Lamb et al. (1991) concluded: "The reinforcing effects of morphine can occur in the
absence of self-reported subjective effects and thus, do not appear to be causally related to drug-
liking or euphoria" (p. 1172). These kinds of data are very important because they establish that
the motivation to take drugs (drug wanting) is not always directly attributable to the subjective
pleasurable effects of drugs (drug liking), and it is possible this is especially true in addicts. That
is, one must consider the possibility that in addicts the subjective pleasurable effects and the
motivational effects of drugs are merely correlated effects. They occur together most of the time,
but they can be dissociated and there is no necessary causal relationship between them."
Thus, Robinson & Berridge (2000) provide ample support that at least in drug
addicts, liking and wanting are often severely dissociated. The wanting of drug in an
addict might be completely dissociated from either the liking of administering it or the
disliking of the withdrawal symptoms. But do these dissociations happen in more
mundane settings? Well... Has it ever happened to you that you worked hard to get a
good grade in a test to be mildly relived (rather than being ecstatic) upon receiving the
grade? Have you ever spent an enormous amount of time choosing a piece of furniture or
a vase to hardly even notice it once it settles in your living room? Have you ever been
reluctant to spend time and money on buying a new gadget but immensely enjoyed the
new toy upon receiving it as a gift? Of course, such occasions could be explained by
mistaken predictions, but at the same time, we could interpret them as some divergence
of motivated and non-motivated preferences, or liking and wanting.
In this paper we discuss measures that elicit two types of preferences that seem
very much akin to wanting and liking, and at the same time, can be easily implemented in
118
a computer lab. The methods would also rate zero on intrusiveness in comparison with
any neuroimaging study. In addition, the method that we suggest for eliciting wanting is
incentive compatible, and both measures are continuous.
Method
In order to show that liking and wanting are distinct, it is first important to find a
set of stimuli and a group of people for who liking and wanting for the stimuli might
diverge. The main difference between liking and wanting is motivation, thus we need to
come up either with a set of stimuli that are very motivating for some people but less for
others, or two sets of stimuli such that one set is very motivating and the other is not.
One of the strongest human motivations, sexual drive, suits our purposes very
well because there are two natural groups of people with different levels of motivation in
respect to sexual drive, men and women. According to Baumeister & Vohs (2004), most
heterosexual sexual activity is a marketplace where women are endowed with a valuable
resource, sex, and trade it for money, and commitment, whereas male sexuality has no
value. At the same time female sexual drive is relatively low and only interferes with the
woman's bargaining power for the fair price. If this theory is too harsh to believe, here
are some empirical findings from (Baumeister et al., 2001, cited in Baumeister & Vohs,
2004)
"On every measure, men were found to display greater sexual motivation than women.
Specifically, men think about sex more often, have more frequent fantasies, are more frequently
aroused, desire sex more often (both early and late in relationships and outside of relationships),
desire a higher number of sex partners, masturbate more frequently, are less willing to forego sex
and are less successful at celibacy (even when celibacy is supported by personal religious
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commitments), enjoy a greater variety of sexual practices, take more risks and expend more
resources to obtain sex, initiate more goal directed behavior to get sex, refuse sex less often,
commence sexual activity sooner after puberty, have more permissive and positive attitudes
toward most sexual behaviors, are less prone to report a lack of sexual desire, and rate their sex
drives as stronger than women. No findings indicated that women had a stronger sex drive than
men on any measure."
Thus, we should expect men to be more motivated than women to acquire even
mild sexual content. At the same time on the motivation-free measures of liking, it is
possible to find very little differences in men's and women's preferences for the same
content. One such possible content is images of people. Whereas men should be highly
motivated to watch pictures of women, women might be much less motivated to watch
the pictures of men, whereas mere liking might not differ much between sexes.
Second, we need to establish two procedures that extract preferences for the same
type of content such that one is rather passive and does not reflect motivation, and the
other captures motivation, for example, makes one exert effort in order to get the content.
We suggest that simple rating task is a natural measure for passive, non-motivated type of
preferences (liking). As for the task high on motivation we will use the keypress task
introduced in Aharon et al. (2001, also see Elman et al., 2005). This method requires
participants to exert effort in order to experience more of the desired and less of the
undesired stimuli. That is, participants view a set of pictures one by one for a fixed total
amount of time, but they can prolong the viewing time of any given picture by alternating
two keys on the keyboard and decrease viewing time by alternating two other keys. We
speculate that the keypress task allows us to measure preferences that are motivated and
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driven, rather than preferences that represent mere liking because without motivation why
would one spend any effort on clicking?
We conduct four experiments to verify that the two measures actually measure
liking and wanting, as well establishing some properties of wanting and liking for a
certain type of stimuli, pictures of faces. In Experiment 1 we compare how men and
women perform on the two measures. We find that even thought men can appreciate the
beauty of both male and female faces, their driven preferences do not mimic mere liking.
That is, men will only exert effort to see the pictures of beautiful women, but not of
beautiful men. Contrary to our predictions women do not exert less effort to see beautiful
male faces than men do for beautiful female faces; women are equally motivated to see
beautiful female and male faces. We hypothesize that, for women, wanting has a social
component together with the sexual one, whereas only the sexual one seems to be the
driver for men with these stimuli. We test this conjecture in Experiment 2 and the data
support it. In Experiment 3 we try to establish whether the results replicate with a set of
stimuli that are devoid of any driving force (sexual or social), the images of buildings.
We find that most of the distinction between male and female "wanting" for the stimuli is
gone. Finally, in Experiment 4 we test some alternative explanations of the findings.
Experiment 1
Motivation. Because the main difference between wanting and liking is the
presence and absence of motivation, we need to use two measures that differ in the same
way; in addition we might want to use two sets of stimuli that differ on motivation or two
populations that differ on motivation with respect to the stimuli. As mentioned above,
the task of finding two groups of people differing on motivation can be solved by using
men and women and some type of (even mild) sexual content. According to (Baumeister
et al., 2001) we should expect (heterosexual) men to be much more motivated to acquire
such content than women. Following (Aharon et al., 2001) we use pictures of male and
female faces as stimuli and predict that men will be much more driven to see pictures of
attractive women than women will be motivated to see pictures of attractive men. As
non-driving stimuli we use the pictures of unattractive people. In addition, for men
pictures of men and for women pictures of women should have no motivation (or have
negative motivation).
The task that does involve motivation is a task that requires effort to make a
stimulus stay longer or shorter on screen. In particular, we use the keypress task from
(Aharon et al., 2001) in which participants watch pictures one at a time for a total fixed
duration of time but have some control over how long each particular picture stays on
screen. Participants have to press two keys in alternation on the keyboard in order for a
particular picture to stay longer on the screen and two other keys in order to reduce the
viewing time of the picture. The motivation-free task that we use is a simple rating of
attractiveness.
Thus we have a task that is motivational (the keypress task) and one that is not
(ratings); we have a motivational stimuli (beautiful faces) and a stimuli with no or
negative motivation (average faces); we also have a population-stimuli pair (men and
pictures of beautiful women) that we predict to show more motivation than another pair
(women and pictures of beautiful men). We predict that with the non-motivational task,
participants will be rather "objective" and will rate beautiful faces higher than average
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ones independent of the gender of either the participant or the target. With the
motivational task, we predict that participants will exert effort to see the beautiful faces
of opposite gender, and men will exert more effort to see faces of beautiful women than
women to see faces of beautiful men.
Method. We asked 17 women and 18 men to rate 80 pictures of male and female
faces on a scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 10 (very attractive). Of the 80 pictures, 40
were pictures of women's faces, and 40 of men's faces. Twenty of the 40 male pictures
were pictures of attractive men (according to a pretest), and the other 20 - of average
men, and similarly for female pictures. Before or after the ratings (counterbalanced),
participants were asked to work for 10 minutes on the following task. They would see a
picture (same pictures were used) that would stay on screen by default for 8 sec. Subjects
could press keys "x" and "z" (in alternation) on the keyboard to increase the duration of
the picture staying on the screen. Similarly, they could alternate between keys "n" and
"m" to reduce the amount of time that the picture remained on the screen. 2 Once the
picture disappeared, a new one would appear. A "slider" to the left of the picture
indicated remaining viewing time and changed depending on the keypressing. In case
2 Each keypress increased or decreased the total viewing time according to the following formula:
NewTotalTime = OldTotalTime + (ExtremeTime - OldTotalTime)/K, where ExtremeTime was Os for
keypresses reducing the viewing time, ExtremeTime was 16 s for keypresses increasing the viewing time,
and K was a scaling constant set to 40.
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participants saw all the pictures before the 10 min expired, they started watching the
pictures again. The pictures were appearing in a random order, created independently for
each participant.
Dependent Measures. We use the following procedure to create each
participant's keypress score and rating score for each type of pictures. For each viewing
of a picture by a participant in the keypress task, we add a point to her score of that
viewing for each key-press that a participants made in order to view the picture more, and
we subtract one point for each key-press that she made in order to view the picture less.
We then take a simple average of the scores of all viewings of the picture by the
participant to create the participant's keypress score for the picture. Finally we collapse
data within participants, so that there is only one rating and one keypress score
observation for each combination of subject, target gender, and target beauty (i.e. four
observations per participant).
Results. As predicted, participants rate beautiful pictures higher than the average
pictures independent of the gender of the participant and the target (see
Figure 2). In a 2 [Subject Gender] x 2 [Target Gender] x 2[Target Beauty]
ANOVA, with Subject Gender as a between subject factor, and the other two as within
subject factors, and the ratings as the dependent variable, the only significant factor is
Target Beauty [F(1, 99) = 469.18, p<0.0001], none of the other factors, or second or third
order interactions is significant.
When clicking to make the pictures stay for longer or shorter times, the
participants demonstrate a different set of preferences (see Figure 3). In an ANOVA with
keypress scores as the dependent measure, and the same factors as above, all the factors,
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second-order and third-order interactions are significant. To tease out the effects, we run
separate ANOVAs for average and beautiful targets. For average faces, neither the gender
of the target, nor the gender of the subject, nor the interaction is significant. However, for
beautiful faces, all three are significant. To tease effects further apart, we perform t-tests
and find that men exert more effort in order to see beautiful female pictures than beautiful
male pictures (t(17) = 5.88, p < 0.0001), whereas women exert the same amount of effort
to see the beautiful men and women (t (16) = 1.18, p = 0.26). Or alternatively, men and
women exert the same amount of effort to see beautiful women (t(33) = 0.02, p = 0.98),
but men spend much less effort to see beautiful men (t(33) = 5.78, p < 0.0001). Contrary
to our predictions, there is no difference between the keypress scores of men clicking to
see beautiful women and women clicking to see beautiful men (t(33) = 0.51, p = 0.61)
Given such statistics, women's liking and wanting patterns seemed to be in line,
whereas for men, the two measures seemed to diverge. We compare men's and women's
correlations of rankings and keypress scores, and we find that whereas for women the
correlation is 0.79 (p < 0.0001), for men it is 0.21 (p = 0.13), and the latter is significantly
lower (z = 5.05, p < 0.0001).3
Discussion. Participants rate beautiful faces higher than average faces
independent of gender of the subject or target. However, when effort is required to
prolong or reduce the duration of viewing the pictures, only women's actions are in line
3 Additional analysis was performed with the original data (80 observations per participant, that is, one
observation per picture per participant). We calculated rank-order (Spearman) correlations between rating
and keypress for each participant. For women, mean correlation was 0.74 (SD =0.16, Min = 0.34, Max = 0.
93), allps below 0.01. For men, the rank-order correlations were significantly lower (M = 0.47, SD = 0.25,
Min = -0.08, Max = 0.79; compared to women t (29) = 3.87, p < 0.001), the mean p-value was 0.08 (SD =
0.23, Min < 0.0001, Max = 0.89). Thus, not only are men not interested in viewing beautiful men, even on
the rank basis the two types of men's preferences are not aligned. It could imply, that men look at different
aspects of the face when rating than when keypressing, rather than looking at the same aspects but valuing
them differently.
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with their ratings; they click more to see beautiful faces than average faces independent
of the target gender. At the same time, men are only interested in seeing beautiful
women, and click much less for all men's faces and average women's. Thus, even though
there seems to be consensus on who is beautiful and who is not, independent of the
gender of the viewer or the targets, women are interested in seeing all beautiful people,
whereas men are only interested in seeing beautiful women.
The most important outcome of this experiment is that if we believe that the
measures we use reflect liking and wanting, then liking and wanting for these simple
stimuli - faces of people - diverge. In particular, the two measures diverge for men. We
cannot interpret this finding in terms of constructed preferences, because if the two
procedures influence the side of the preferences that is revealed by participants, there
should not be any difference in the outcome for men and women. Similarly, lack of
incentives cannot explain the results, because the keypress task is incentive compatible
and but reveals different preferences from two subsamples. Thus, it seems quite likely
that the two tasks measure two types of preferences for the same person.
The second finding is that women's driven preferences for beautiful faces are
equally strong for beautiful faces of men and women. Although we expected this
difference to be smaller than the corresponding difference for men, we did not expect it to
be zero. There are at least three potential explanations for this finding.
One possibility is that the sample in the study included some nontrivial number of
gay participants, and more gay women than gay men. Although in general, we have no
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reason to believe that the proportion of gay women in our sample is higher than in
general population,4 this hypothesis is worth crossing out.5
Another possible explanation is that our stimuli elicit different drives from men
and women. If men's reaction to the images is purely sexually driven, whereas women'
reaction is socially driven (in addition to being sexual), the observed results should occur.
If we think of the popular culture, what kind of pictures are men and women driven to?
Anecdotal evidence suggests that pictures of beautiful females are just as likely to be seen
in a female oriented as in a male oriented magazine. In fact, in a fashion magazine, whose
audience is mostly women, most images could be those of women. On the contrary, any
magazine with a predominantly male audience is unlikely to have even half of its images
to be of men.
These observations suggest that men's desire for images of beautiful women
rather than beautiful men, is brought about by the sexual drive; whereas in women there
is a social driving force on top of the natural sex drive. As a result we might find that for
women the desire to watch images of beautiful women is stronger than men's desire to
watch images of beautiful men. As part of the future research, we can conduct an
experiment where the keypress task is preceded by a priming stage, where participants
are primed by some material related to either sexual or social interactions. If the
4 For example (Smith, 2003) states that "the gay and lesbian communities have long adopted 10% as the
portion of the population that is homosexual." His own estimates (and those of the studies he cites) are even
lower.
5 To see if there were indeed two types of women in the distribution, we regressed the keypresses and the
ratings on target gender, beauty and interaction, separately for men and women, and analyzed the residuals.
The histograms did not show any major split into two groups for either men or women, for either
keypresses' or ratings' residuals. We also compared the variances of the residuals between genders. For the
ratings, there was no significant difference (F(67, 71) = 0.93, p = 0.77), but the variance of women's
keypress residuals was marginally higher than that for men (F (67, 71) =1.57, p =0.06). This later finding
can be seen as evidence in support of a more diverse women's population as far as the motivated
preferences are concerned. Thus, sexual orientation might be indeed a factor in the findings.
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explanation above is true, it can be the case that socially primed men will become more
interested in viewing pictures of beautiful male faces, and sexually primed women will
become less interested in viewing beautiful women.
Finally it is possible that what we find is a very general pattern, that is, no matter
what the stimuli are, for men their likings are less predictive of their wantings than for
women.
In order to tease apart these three possibilities, we conduct two additional
experiments. In order to pursue the possibility that social aspect is a part of women's
wanting in relation to images of faces (as well as the minor goal of the possibility that the
sexual orientation mix was biased in Experiment 1) we run Experiment 2, where we take
record of the participants sexual orientation, and intentionally target half-gay-half-straight
sample.
In Experiment 3 we use a set of stimuli that should have no drive for most people,
images of buildings. If it is the case that for women, wanting and liking are better
correlated than for men, the effect will be replicated even with these "driveless" stimuli;
however it seems more plausible that for this type of stimuli liking and wanting will be
perfectly aligned for all people.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiments 1 suggest that whereas for men the driving force in
"wanting" is purely sexual, for women, it has a social aspect as well, because women are
as motivated to see pictures of beautiful women as of beautiful men. However, it could be
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the case that our sample in Experiment 1 includes some proportion of gay women (and no
or fewer gay men). If this is the case, then the finding could be driven by the fact that
women, just like men, are only motivated to see images of the gender of interest, and the
social aspect has no weight in the drive. In order to see whether this is the case, in
Experiment 2, we replicate the keypress part of Experiment 1, but this time, ask
participants to identify their sexual preferences; we also target a half-straight-half-gay
sample.
Another possibility is that it is not the gender of participants that drives the
difference, but rather the preferred gender of sexual interest. It could be that it is not
women who are equally motivated to view pictures of beautiful men and women, but it
could be that those whose primary sexual interest is women (that is straight men and gay
women) are equally motivated to watch the pictures of beautiful men and women.
Thus, we ask the question of whether the gender or sexual preferences drive the
diversion of liking and wanting of watching images of faces. For example, when clicking
to see the pictures, are gay men closer to straight men, because they share gender or are
they closer to straight women because they share the gender of interest?
Method. Thirty men (15 gay and 15 straight) and 27 women (12 gay and 15
straight) participated in the keypressing task identical to the one in Experiment 1.
Results. Just as in Experiment 1, we collapse data, so that there is one
observation of the keypress score for each subject, target gender, target beauty
combination (in total, four observations per participant). The means of the keypress
scores can be seen in Figure 4. We subject the scores to a 2 [Subject Gender] x 2 [Subject
Sexual Preferences] x 2 [Target Gender] x 2 [Target Beauty] ANOVA, with the first two
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factors between subject and the last two within subject. The main effect of target beauty
is significant, participants exert more effort to see beautiful faces than to see average
faces [F (1, 159) =81.48, p < 0.0001]; there is no main effect of subject gender [F(1, 159)
= 0.98, p=0.33], or sexual preferences [F (1, 159) = 1. 60, p=0.21], or the target gender
[F(1, 159) = 1.32, p=0.26]. Among the interaction effects, the following are at least
marginally significant, Subject Gender x Subject Sexual Preferences [F (1, 159) =5.49, p
= 0.02], Subject Gender x Target Beauty [F (1, 159) =3.30, p = 0.07], Subject Sexual
Preferences x Target Gender [F (1, 159) =4.54, p = 0.03] Subject Sexual Preferences x
Target Beauty [F (1, 159) =6.38, p = 0.01], Target Gender x Target Beauty [F (1, 159)
=6.89, p < 0.01] Subject Gender x Subject Sexual Preferences x Target Gender [F (1,
159) =13.75, p < 0.001], Subject Gender x Subject Sexual Preferences x Target Gender x
Target Beauty [F (2, 159) =11.57, p < 0.00001]
We then split the data by Target Beauty and run separate ANOVAs for beautiful
and average targets. For average targets, there are no main or interaction affects. For the
beautiful targets, there is no main effect of Subject Gender [F (1, 53) =3.30, p = 0.20], or
Target Gender [F (1, 53) =1.42, p = 0.24], but there is a marginally significant effect of
Subject Sexual Preferences [F (1, 53) = 2.98, p = 0.09], and the following significant
interactions, Subject Gender x Subject Sexual Preferences [F (1, 53) = 6.03, p = 0.02],
Subject Sexual Preferences x Target Gender [F (1, 53) = 10.26, p < 0.01], Subject Gender
x Subject Sexual Preferences x Target Gender [F (1, 53) = 26.41, p < 0.00001].
In short, whereas all subjects exert equal effort to watch beautiful female images
[F (3, 53) = 0.44, p = 0.73], there is a great variation on the effort spent watching
beautiful male pictures [F (3, 53) = 11.81, p < 0.00001].
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As there is small amount of interest among subjects in the average faces, and no
difference between the amounts in the four types of participants, we next focus our
attention on the beautiful faces only. We also construct a new dependent variable. For
each participant we subtract his or her keypress score for beautiful targets of the
"undesired" gender from the score for the "desired" gender. That is, for gay male and
straight female participants, this is the difference between their scores for beautiful male
and female targets; for straight male and gay female participants, it is the difference
between their average scores for beautiful female and male targets. Figure 5 demonstrates
the means of this variable across the four types of participants. We intentionally show the
bars in an increasing order. This seems to be the order in which the weight of the sexual
motivation is increased (and that of the social motivation is decreased) in the driving
("wanting") force of the pictures for the four types of participants.
We subject the new DV ("Difference") to an ANOVA with two between subject
factors, Subject Gender and Subject Sexual Preferences. The main effect of Subject
Gender is significant, for women the Difference is smaller than for men (F(1, 53) =
10.26, p < 0.01). The main effect of Subject Sexual Preferences is not significant (F(1,
53) = 0.02, p = 0.88). However the interaction is (F(1, 53) = 4.26, p = 0.04), that is, gay
women and men are closer on this measure than straight men and women. To sum up, the
difference in amounts of effort that men exert in order to see "desired" and "non-desired"
images is significantly larger than that for women, and more so for straight than for gay
participants.
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It seems plausible that for men the most important driving force in this task is the
sexual appeal, whereas for women the social drive is also present. This diversion is much
smaller for gay people (in fact, it is insignificant, t (24) = 0.74, p = 0.47).
Discussion. The findings in Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment 1 in
that the straight women are equally interested in watching the pictures of attractive men
and women, whereas straight men are only interested in watching pictures of beautiful
women. Thus, it is not some unobservable mix of gay and straight participants driving the
findings in Experiment 1. In addition, we find that the weights that the social and sexual
drives have in the wantings of gay men and women are about the same, whereas straight
women put the least weight on the sexual aspect, in fact non at all (for them the
Difference is indistinguishable from zero, t(14) = 0.24, p = 0.82), and straight men put
the most weight on the sexual drive.
Experiment 3
Experiment 1 shows that the wanting and liking for images of human faces are
much more divergent for men than for women. One possible explanation is that men have
more divergence on the two measures independent of the type of stimuli used. To test for
this possibility in Experiment 3, we use a set of stimuli devoid of any driving force. For
these stimuli we expect complete alignment of wanting and liking independent of the
participant's gender. However, if it is indeed the case, that men are more divergent than
women on liking and wanting in general, we expect to see it even with these motivation-
free stimuli.
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The main goal of Experiment 3, however, is to check that when there is no
motivation in the stimuli, liking and wanting do not diverge. In Experiment 3, our
participants perform the keypress and the rating tasks with stimuli that seem to be devoid
of any kind of driving force, images of buildings. Because the main difference between
liking and wanting is motivation, there should be no difference in the ratings and
keypresses when the stimuli is void of any motivation.
Method. We asked 17 women and 17 men to rate 16 average and 16 beautiful
(according to a pretest) buildings on a scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 10 (very
attractive). Participants also performed the keypress task (before or after the rating), with
the same pictures for the duration of 10 min6
Results. As in Experiment 1 we collapse the data so that there is one observation
per building beauty per subject (i.e. two observations per subject). We first subject the
ratings to a 2 [Gender] x [Building Beauty] ANOVA, with Gender as a between subject
factor, and Beauty as within subject factors. Unsurprisingly, participants rate beautiful
buildings as more beautiful than average buildings (F(1, 32) = 125.6, p < 0.0001),
whereas Gender is insignificant (F(1, 32) = .02, p = 0.89), see Figure 6. The interaction is
significant (F(1, 32) = 6.78, p = 0.01), with women showing larger difference in rating
the two type of buildings than men. In a similar ANOVA with keypress scores as the
dependent measure, the results are similar. Participants exert more effort to see beautiful
buildings than average ones (F(1, 32) = 55.2, p < 0.0001); neither the main effect of
6 The default time for the picture staying on screen was 6 sec; and participants could change according to
the same formulas as in Experiment 1, except that the ExtremeTime for keypresses increasing the viewing
time was equal to 12.
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Gender (F(1, 32) < 0.01, p = 0.97) nor the interaction (F(1, 32) = 0.53, p = 0.47) is
significant, see Figure 7.
The correlation coefficient between ratings and the keypress score is 0.75 (p <
0.0001) for women and 0.70 (p < 0.0001) for men, which are not significantly different (z
= 0.03,p = 0.62).
Discussion. When the stimuli are devoid of any motivation, the liking and
wanting measures are well aligned for both men and women. Thus, there is no inherent
propensity to be more divergent on the two measures for men than for women. This
finding supports the conclusion that the difference we observe in Experiment 1 is
explained by the different patterns of wanting of the beautiful faces in men and women,
such that men's wanting is represented by the sexual drive only, whereas women express
both sexual and social drive.
The findings also provide additional support to the fact that the outcome of
Experiment 1 cannot be interpreted in terms of constructed preferences. If the different
patterns of outcomes for men and women in Experiment 1 stems from the fact that the
two procedures elicit different aspects of preferences in men, and the same preference in
women, then the same should be true with other stimuli, including the pictures of
building. However, there is no such diversion for the buildings, and thus the constructed
preferences explanation fails.
Experiment 4
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So far, the data suggest that ratings and the keypress task measure two types of
preferences that converge for some stimuli and some people (e.g. pictures of buildings for
all people) and diverge for others (pictures of beautiful male faces for men). It also seems
that ratings are measuring something akin to liking and keypresses measure something
akin to wanting. This is so, because we associate wanting with motivation and exerting
effort - and it is in the keypress task that participants have to exert effort, - whereas
liking is a type of preferences that does not necessarily reflect motivation, and simple
rating does not measure motivation. However, in addition to having no motivation, liking
has other properties and aspects. In particular, liking should definitely reflect the internal
enjoyment that the stimulus provides. And this is where our rating task might be faulty.
We do not ask participants to say how much they enjoy the pictures. Instead, we
ask them how attractive the faces and the buildings are. When we say that straight men's
liking and wanting for pictures of beautiful men are not aligned, do we imply that the men
in the Experiment 1 like the beautiful male faces and would enjoy watching them did they
choose to click for them? Or, is it that they simply acknowledged the beauty of the
beautiful guys without enjoying those pictures? Thus, there seem to be two possible types
of liking, one - an externally oriented feeling of admitting aesthetic qualities but not
reflecting internal pleasure, and the other - reflecting internal enjoyment and more
predictive of wanting. So far, the instrument we use to measure liking, rating of
attractiveness, seems to be the external, aesthetics appreciation type of preferences rather
than a more internal, enjoyment type of liking.
To see if we can tackle the enjoyment aspect of liking and to see how it relates to
the two constructs that we have discussed so far, we conduct another experiment, where
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we introduce a different rating task, measuring enjoyment, rather than acknowledgement
of aesthetic quality. That is, instead of asking our participants to rate the faces on
attractiveness, we ask them how much they are enjoying watching the face. If this new
measure is better aligned with the attractiveness ratings than with the keypress task then
we are at a better position to claim that the ratings (even on the "wrong" scale) are about
liking and keypresses are about wanting. If, on the other hand, the new measure is better
aligned with the keypresses than with the attractiveness ratings then our original
interpretation is in trouble and keypresses actually capture some combination of liking
and wanting as well, whereas the attractiveness measure captures aesthetic judgments.
Method. The experiment involved three tasks, "Keypress task," "Attractiveness
Ratings," and "Enjoyment Ratings." In all three tasks the participant worked with the
same 80 pictures as in Experiment 1.
In the keypress task, the participant watched the pictures in a random order for a
default time of 4 sec per picture, and a total time of about 10 min. The participant could
alternate "z" and "x" keys to reduce the viewing time of a picture or alternate "m" and
"n" keys to increase the viewing time. 7 If the participant viewed all the 80 pictures
before the 10 min elapsed, the new cycle with the new random order would start.
In attractiveness rating task, the participant viewed each picture once in a random
order. Underneath the picture there was a scale with a probe. The participant could move
the probe to the left by pressing the "z" key, or to the right by pressing the "n" key, and
as a result answer the question "How attractive do you find this person?" with the
anchors "Not at all attractive" and "Very attractive."
7 The exact formula is the same as in Experiment 1, except that ExtremeTime was set at 8 sec.
The enjoyment rating task was identical to the attractiveness rating task, except
that the question was "How much are you enjoying viewing this face?" and the anchors
were "Not at all enjoying" and "Enjoying a lot."
Each participant performed two of the three tasks, randomly selected and in
random order. Each participant worked on one task in the beginning of a 1.5 hour
experimental session, and on the other task later in the session, with unrelated studies in
between. After performing the second task, participants were also asked about their
gender and sexual preferences. In the sexual preferences question, participants had an
option not to respond; if they did respond, they did so by moving a pointer on a scale
anchored at "Definitely straight" and "Definitely gay."
Results and Discussion. A total of 72 men and 54 women took part in the
experiment. Three men and two women did not report their sexual orientation; 5 men and
one woman reported to be definitely gay; 42 men and 24 women reported to be definitely
straight. The histograms of the answers on a 0 (definitely straight) to 100 (definitely gay)
scale are represented in Figure 8. Because there are too few people reporting to be
significantly gay we will consider only those reporting to be definitely straight and those
who score above 0 on the gay scale, but below 26 - a natural breaking point in the data.
In the preliminary analysis in none of the three DVs do we find any difference between
these two groups of participants (straight and slightly gay), nor do we find any significant
interactions between this factor and other factors. Thus, we do not differentiate between
these two groups in the consequent analysis. Our final sample consists of 62 men and 48
women all of whom we may consider to be straight. Each of the 3 tasks was performed
by approximately two thirds of all participants.
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In the same way as before, we create a score for each target gender - target beauty
combination for each subject for each task she performed (the ratings are set to be on a
scale from 0 to 100). The means of the keypress scores, the ratings of attractiveness and
the ratings of enjoying split by the gender of subject and the gender and the beauty of the
targets are shown in Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11. Eyeball analysis suggests that the
keypress task and the attractiveness ratings replicate the findings in Experiment 1, with
the rating of enjoyment placing in between the two measures.
We perform a 2 [Subject Gender] x 2 [Target Gender] x 2 [Target Beauty]
ANOVA for each of the three dependent measures. In all three ANOVAs the three way
interaction is significant (Keypress: F(1, 213) = 9.88, p < 0.01, Rating Attractiveness:
F(1, 207) = 5.35 , p = 0.02, Rating Enjoying: F (1, 222) 10.59, p < 0.01), as well as the
main effect of Target Beauty (Keypress: F(1, 213) = 183.46, p < 0.0001, Rating
Attractiveness: F(1, 207) = 871.54 , p < 0.0001, Rating Enjoying: F (1, 222) = 338.36, p
< 0.0001). For simplicity we perform separate analysis for Average and Beautiful Target.
For the average Targets, neither the gender of the subject nor of the target, nor the
interaction was significant for any of the DVs, so we will limit our analysis to the
Beautiful Targets only. For the beautiful targets, the participants' and the target gender
and the interaction term are significant in all three cases (all ps <0.01); the subject gender
is significant for ratings of attractiveness only (F(1, 69) = 4.58, p = 0.04). Thus on all
three measures participants prefer faces of men to faces of women, but the effect is driven
by male participants. Additional t-tests reveal that women's scores on all three DVs do
not significantly differ between beautiful male and female faces, whereas men's scores
do; on all three measures men preferred women to men.
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Thus, the findings of Experiment 1 do not quite replicate. This time on both the
Keypress task and the Rating of attractiveness men show a preference for beautiful
female faces over beautiful male faces; in Experiment 1 men do not show such a pattern
when rating. However, even in Experiment 1, this difference is true directionally
(although insignificant), so the greater number of participants in Experiment 4 (as well as
eliminating gay subjects) suggests that the pattern is true. 8
Moving on to the main interest of Experiment 4, how do the three measures
differ? In order to directly compare the three measures we need to convert them to one
scale. We do so by going to the original data with 80 observations per subject per task
performed. Then for each participant and each task that she performed we create a z-
score for each observation by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation
(for these subject and task). We then average the z-scores so that there is only one value
for each subject, task performed, target gender, and target beauty. The means of these
new values for beautiful target only are represented in Figure 12. It is easy to see that
women show the same scores for beautiful male and female faces on all three measures,
whereas men show a large difference, with the largest in the keypresses. As in
Experiment 2, for each of the three measures, we subtract the value that a person has for
the "desired" gender, and the "undesired." The mean differences are presented in Figure
13. We then subject the "Differences" to a 3[Measure type] x 2[Subject Gender]
ANOVA. Not surprising the Difference is larger for men than for women (F(1, 122) =
29.35, p < 0.0001), but most importantly, the main effect of Measure type (F(2, 122) =
2.99, p = 0.05)) and the interaction effect (F(2, 122) = 2.99, p = 0.06)) are marginally
S Note, another difference between the procedures in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 is that in the latter
some of the subjects performed two very similar procedures. However, the pattern remains true if we only
keep those who preformed the Rating of attractiveness first.
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significant. Thus, we can conclude that the Rating of Enjoyment falls somewhere in
between our two original measures.
Another question we might ask, is what type of liking is more predictive of
wanting, external or internal, that is the attractiveness or the enjoyment rating. To do this,
we need to regress the keypress scores on the two ratings. This is impossible, however if
the unit of observation is participant, because none of the participants performed all three
tasks. Thus, we go to the original data, and make a picture a unit of observation. For each
picture we observe an average keypress score, two rating scores and the beauty and
gender of the face in the picture. We regress (with robust standard errors) the keypress
score on the two ratings and the dummies for gender (of the target) and beauty. In this
analysis only two predictors are significant, Rating of Enjoyment (3 = 0.65, t = 4.34, p <
0.001) and the dummy for Female Target (P = 2.18, t = 2.94, p < 0.01). If we exclude the
Rating of Enjoyment from the regressors, then the Rating of Attractiveness becomes
significant (P = 0.58, t = 9.99, p < 0.001). Thus, not surprisingly, both types of liking are
predictive of wanting, but the internal type (measured by Rating of Enjoying) is more
predictive. Thus we might argue, that there is a whole continuum between non-motivated
and motivated preferences, as we move from no-motivation appreciation of, say, beauty,
to a heavily motivated, driven, deeply experienced wanting.
General Discussion and Conclusion.
The fact that different elicitation procedures lead to different revealed preferences
is not new. However, the fact has been largely interpreted in terms of constructed
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preferences, suggesting that people construct exhibited preferences on the spot and that
these exhibited preferences are just different sides of some core preference that is
approached from different angels by different elicitation methods. Recently neuroscience
has offered evidence on truly different preferences within one individual. In particular,
neuroscientists have suggested that wanting and liking are not two sides of the same coin,
but rather two largely independent preferences mostly differing in presence or lack there
of motivation.
In this paper we discuss two methods of eliciting preferences, simple rating, and
the keypress task. The findings from Experiments 1 -3 suggest that for certain stimuli and
certain participants the two methods elicit two differing types of preferences. Data from
the first three experiments support the supposition that the two types of preferences
exhibited are liking, the non-motivated preferences (measured by rating) and the
motivated, driven preferences, wanting (measured by the keypress task). In light of these
findings, it is even possible that the earlier research on preference reversals might have
tackled the :same two types of preferences. For example, it is possible that in the
prominence effect studies, choice reflects wanting and matching reflects liking.
The fourth experiment suggests however that the differentiation between wanting
and liking is not a simple dichotomy, but rather a continuum, and constructs such as the
one measured by ratings of enjoyment might be somewhere on that path. Experiment 4
differs from the other experiments in that it offers an additional rating task that reflects
enjoyment of the stimuli rather than basic beauty appreciation. This measure seems to fall
in between the original two and be better predictive of wanting than the attractiveness
rating. Another way of interpreting the results of the fourth study is to conclude that not
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only there is a dichotomy between wanting and liking, there is an additional dichotomy
between internal and external liking. The external liking is mere acknowledgement of the
fact that (some) other people will enjoy the stimulus, whereas the internal liking reflects
real enjoyment and is a better predictor of wanting than the external liking.
One last issues to discuss is the implications of this research for the
contingent evaluation (CV) method (see, for example, Carson et al., 2001). CV is usually
used as an alternative to revealed preferences in estimating a particular public good's
value to the public. For example, in estimating the (negative) value of noise, one might
compare the rent prices close to and far from an airport (the revealed preferences
approach), or on can run a survey and ask the respondents how much they are eager to
pay for the airport not to be built next to their home, or how much they would accept for
the airport to be built (CV approach). One can draw a parallel between the rating task
and CV on the one hand, and the keypress task and revealed preferences on the other
hand. Ratings and CV measure merely stated preferences, not substantiated by any kind
of motivation, whereas keypresses and revealed preferences measures pertain to actual
behavior and thus could be seen as more solid. For this very reason, economists prefer the
revealed preferences approach to CV.
However, imagine a person, who on the one hand states in a survey, that she
would pay a substantial amount of money for preservation of rainforests, but on the other
hand, buys the furniture produced of rainforest wood because it is cheaper. Which of the
two contradictory preferences should the policy makers take into the account? The
constructed preferences approach suggests some composite of the two measures should
be used. However, if the two measures (as we argue in this paper) actually measure two
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different types of preferences, then taking an average does not make much sense. Instead,
one might say that the preference revealed in the survey is morally superior to the one
revealed on the store, because the former is not tainted by self-interest.
Here is some insight from the current research. Imagine that we were in the
business of figuring out which men are beautiful and which are not, and we had the rating
and the keypress task data discussed above. Which type of the men's preference for faces
should we take into the account, rating or keypress. If we only measure keypresses we do
not feel that the outcome would reflect what people actually consider beauty. Revealed
preferences approach can be suffering from this drawback as well. We argue that because
CV reflects no self-interest, it is morally superior and is the one that should use. Thus, the
findings in this paper suggest that the non-motivated preferences are not necessarily
inferior to the motivated ones and should not be completely discarded. Whereas
economists suggest that CV should be a supplementary measure in general, or only used
when there is no market for measuring revealed preferences (e.g. for value of a wild life
habitat where public will not be admitted), we suggest that it could be measuring
something completely different from revealed preferences and something which might in
fact be morally superior to motivated preferences.
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Figure 11
Ratings of Enjoying Viewing
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